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 Traditional economic theories have always assumed that individuals are acting rationality 
when making their investment choices, in particular these theories from a legislation point of 
view are underlying assumptions of well-informed market participants, thus market failures and 
information asymmetries have to be overcome by introducing obligations to inform in order to 
enhance the information basis of investors. Fundamental problems regarding the traditional 
approach in finance and securities market regulation were discovered by the financial crisis, 
which puts into discussion the rationale approach behavior and information obligations. 
Consequently, for European legislation it was obvious that a revise of the directive in financial 
instrument markets was needed. Therefore, in the chapter one of this thesis will be analyzed the 
passage from MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) to MiFID II. It will also be 
seen that the key areas of this new directive are as following: (i) internal control and governance; 
(ii) market structure; (iii) market transparency; (iv) investor protection; and (v) reporting and 
market oversight.  
 The second chapter, instead, is dedicated to the analyses of behavioral finance literature 
and to affect that behaviors may have on decision making. Behavioral finance is a new field that 
wants to provide explanations for why people make irrational financial decisions. It can be 
considered as the outcome of a mix of sciences such as: psychology, finance and sociology. 
Behavioral finance observes that investors rarely are behaving rational, as the traditional 
economic theories are assuming, since a lot of factors are affecting our decisions while we are 
investing. The models used by this field are less narrow than those based on Von Neumann – 
Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. It is important to understand 
behavioral finance as an integration of classical economics and financial theories, not as a 
replacement of the standard evolution approaches, technical and market analyses.  
 The two building blocks of behavioral finance are the cognitive psychology and the limits 
to arbitrage. Regarding the first will be analyzed the cognitive biases such as: overconfidence, 
base rate neglect, representativeness bias, loss aversion, anchoring, availability bias, mental 
accounting, procrastination, and herding. Instead, for the second will be seen in what 
circumstances arbitrage forces will be effective. Another important issue will be the behavioral 
portfolio theory.  
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 MiFID legislation in order to comply with the suitability requirement among the 
information that intermediaries must obtain it includes the clients’ risk propensity and risk 
profile. Therefore, chapter three will be dedicated to risk tolerance. Here the behavioral finance it 
makes the distinction between risk aversion defined by the Expected Utility Theory and the risk 
tolerance defined as the degree of variability investment returns than an investor is willing to 
withstand. Cognitive biases have a crucial importance in determining the risk profile of a client 
and the factors affecting the risk tolerance are: age, gender, marital status, education, financial 
knowledge, and income. Understanding the relationship between these factors and risk tolerance 
of an individual have been interesting for a lot of researches who have made different studies 
trying to assess financial risk tolerance. From the legislative point of view  it has been important 
the regime of “know your client”, therefore suitability and appropriateness tests are needed when 
firms try to sell a product or service to a client.  
 The final chapter will be dedicated to a new field developed by behavioral finance and 
their findings from psychology and neurology, the so-called neurofinance. Neurofinance looks 
inside the brain for explaining in a better way a wide range of individual economic behaviors and 
their effects translated into aggregate market phenomena.  




Chapter 1: Markets in financial instruments directive  
1.1 From MiFID I to MiFID II  
MiFID came into force on November 2007, replacing the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD) which was adopted in 1993. The scope of MiFID was to remove the barriers to cross-
border financial services within Europe, promote a competitive and level playing field between 
trading venues for financial instruments in the European Economic Area (EEA), and improve 
investor protection across EEA. The aim of MiFID was to design a ‘coherent’, ‘risk-sensitive’, 
and ‘comprehensive’ regulatory framework for the execution of financial instruments to promote 
investor protection, and the integrity, efficiency, and orderly functioning of financial markets. 
With the implementation of investor protection and market efficiency MiFID was aiming at 
reaching two high-level principles set by the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP): 
i. A single market for wholesale financial services; 
ii. An integrated securities and derivatives market.  
After the financial crisis of 2008 several factors have called for a more extensive review of 
MiFID directive. The financial crisis exposed the weaknesses of this directive in the functioning 
and transparency of financial markets, in front of this the European Commission considered 
essential to revise MiFID to establish a safer, sounder, more transparent and more responsible 
financial system. The European Commission noted that MiFID needed to be revised to:  
i. Regulate opaque parts of the financial system to improve the organization, transparency 
and the oversight of certain market segments, including with respect to those instruments 
traded over-the-counter (OTC); 
ii. Support the original purpose of efficient and integrated financial markets and consider 
rapid changes in technological advancements; 
iii. Further strengthen investor protection throughout the EU; 
iv. Where appropriate minimize discretion of national regulators in applying European law to 
the financial services sector.  
4 
 
In June 2014, the European Commission adopted new rules revising the MiFID framework. 
This consisted of a directive (MiFID II) and a regulation (MiFIR). The final legislative texts of 
Directive 2014/65/EU1 (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No 600/20142 (MiFIR) were approved 
by the European Parliament on 15 April 2014 and by the European Council on 13 May 2014. The 
two texts were published in the Official Journal on 12 June 2014 and entered into force on the 
twentieth day following this publication – i.e. 2 July 2014. Many of the obligations under MiFID 
II and MiFIR were further specified in the Commission Delegated Directive and two Commission 
Delegated Regulations, as well as regulatory and implementing technical standards developed by 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). MiFID II and MiFIR, together with the 
Commission delegated acts as well as regulatory and implementing technical standards will be 
applicable from 3 January 2018.  
In the picture below we see more in detail the differences between MiFID I and MiFID II. 
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  1.2 MiFID II scope and timeline legislative 
MiFID II is the new European discipline for the provision of investment services which 
reinforces the protection of retail investors with specific measures on financial products, defines 
the characteristics of independent consultancy services and refines the rules on valuation of 
adequacy and the obligation of communication to the clients. MiFID II aims at establishing a 
safer, sounder, more transparent and more responsible financial system that works for the 
economy and society as a whole. For doing so MiFID II: 
➢ ensures that trading takes place on regulated platforms; 
➢ introduces rules on high frequency trading; 
➢ improves the transparency and oversight of financial markets and addresses the issue of 
price volatility in commodity derivatives markets; 
➢ improves conditions for competition in the trading and clearing of financial instruments; 
➢ builds on the rules already in place, the revised MiFID rules strengthen the protection of 
investors by introducing robust organizational and conduct requirements. 




1.3 The five key areas of reform in MiFID II 
For achieving its own objectives, the main contributions introduced by MiFID II are: 
1. Internal control and governance. 
A fundamental objective of legislative action within the European supervisory institution 
continue to be a good corporate governance. Therefore, the aim of MiFID II is to strengthen the 
role of management bodies of investment firms, regulated market and data reporting services 
providers, in ensuring sound and prudent management of the firms, the promotion of market 
integrity and the interest of investors.  
MiFID II establishes a strengthen corporate governance regime, enhanced with prescription 
around governing board and committee composition, fitness and property, and time commitment. 
The role of the compliance officer it is also strengthened. MiFID II requires a recording of where 
senior management deviates from the compliance officer’s assessment and recommendations, and 
an explanation as to the remedial action the investment firm intends to take.  
MiFID II sets the overall requirement to store records of all orders and all transaction for a 
minimum period of five years.  
2. Market structure. 
The market structure framework introduced by MiFID II closes loopholes and ensures that 
trading, whenever appropriate, takes place on a regulated platform. All organized trading will 
take place on regulated trading venues or by systematic internalizes (SIs). One of the most 
important changes of MiFID II is the introduction of a new type of trading platform, the 
Organised Trading Facility (OTF)1. The OTF category applies only to non-equity instruments and 
allows operators to have discretion over order execution. OTFs must be authorized by the 
regulator and meet certain ongoing requirements which also apply to regulated markets and 
                                                 
1 point (23) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU: ‘Organised trading facility’ or ‘OTF’ means a 
multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an MTF (multilateral trading facility) and in which 
multiple third-party buying and selling interests in bonds, structured finance products, emission 
allowances or derivatives are able to interact in the system in a way that results in a contract in accordance 
with Title II of this Directive; 
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MTFs (multilateral trading facility). However, OTFs will also be subject to certain investor 
protection rules and may not execute orders against their own capital2.  
Derivatives contracts that are eligible for clearing under the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) by the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) will be required to be 
traded on an RM, MTF, or OTF.   
3. Market transparency. 
For the non-equity financial instruments, such as bonds and derivatives it was established for 
the first time the principle of transparency. Under MiFID I we had that pre-trade transparency 
(which requires the publication of the price of real-time orders) and post-trade transparency 
(which requires the immediate publication of the price and volume of executed transaction) were 
applied only to equities traded on a regulated market. Instead, under MiFID II, all trading venues 
(regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities, and organized trading facilities) must publish, 
on a continuous basis, current bid and offer prices and depth-of-trading interest.  
Pre-trade transparency requirements can be waived for: 
➢ Large orders (in relation to normal order/market size) and orders held pending 
disclosure; 
➢ Actionable indications of interest in request-for-quote and voice trading systems 
above a specified size that would expose liquidity providers to undue risk; and 
➢ Financial instruments for which there is not a liquid market. 
 Instead, for post-trade transparency there are no permanent waivers, but reporting can be 
deferred for up to 48 hours in the case where: i) the transaction is in a security for which there is 
not a liquid market; and ii) the size of the transaction is equal to or exceeds the relevant large is 
scale size.   
 To better monitor the trading activity for market abuse, all trading venues and their members 
will need to synchronize their business clocks that are used to timestamp reportable events. 
 
                                                 




4. Investor protection. 
The rules which are included in the MiFID II regarding the investor protection take into 
account the type of services and the classification of clients, with higher protection granted to 
retail clients. 
It’s important to establish the relationship between intermediary and client, especially when 
intermediary works with financial instruments. MiFID II list of financial services3: 
i. Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments;  
ii. Execution of orders on behalf of clients; (Because for example retail clients don’t have 
direct access in market. This is a very basic and naked services) 
iii. Dealing on own account;  
iv. Portfolio management;  
v. Investment advice; 
From i. to v. we notice that the regulation is increasing. For the fourth there must be some 
provisions. The key is to individuate the risk profile of the client. The difference with the MiFID 
I here is huge since MiFID I for individuating the risk for profile it didn’t have a real 
questionnaire but, just a declaration. The clients where less protected since this declaration was 
made by firms, and it stated the level of understanding of the client (general declaration of 
knowledge). In 2007, there was an abuse of this declaration obviously not in the best of the client, 
which we assume it must be the first guideline, but in the best of the firms. With MiFID II there 
was a change in the regulation, it was introduced the MiFID questionnaire. To determine the risk 
profile of the client is very important understanding the skill, the ability and the knowledge that 
the clients have with respect to financial instruments. When the clients show a high knowledge of 
financial instruments the effect of questionnaire turns to be the same as the effect of declaration 
(MiFID I) i.e. less protected.  
 When the risk profile of the client is determined there should be a perfected matching 
between client risk profile and the risk of his portfolio. This kind of perfect matching is not 
                                                 
3 Directive 2014/65/EU, ANNEX I LISTS OF SERVICES AND ACTIVITIES AND FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS, SECTION A  Investment services and activities 
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provided for all types of financial services but only for iv. (portfolio management - the manager 
is deciding the risk taken) and v. (investment advice – the client is only receiving advice). 
 Not all financial services are regulated in the same way. The regulation it depends on the 
nature of the product and on the nature of the client. MiFID II it defines two types of clients:  
a) Retail clients (the most protected), clients which are not professional;  
b) Professional clients (the less protected).  
It is very important to keep in mind the relation between the nature of the service and tha nature 
of the client. As shown below the suitability is applied only when we have type iv. and v. of 
services and only when the client is a retail client. The risk profile and the suitability concept will 
be better explained in the chapter 3 dedicated to risk tolerance. 
 
5. Reporting and market oversight. 
The revised MiFID II proposes to introduce a harmonized third country equivalence regime 
for the access of investment firms and market operators to the EU. Firms wanting to service retail 
clients will be required to establish an EU branch, as well as obtain branch authorization from the 
local authority where the branch is situated. For firms wanting to provide investment services to 
professional and eligible counterparties only, no mandatory presence with a branch in an EU state 
is needed.  
Developments in the market, products and technology have outpaced provisions of the 
original directive, with activities such as high frequency trading (HTF) strategies.  
HTF are a subject of algorithmic trading (AT), which in turn is defined as trading in financial 
instruments where a computer algorithm automatically determines individual parameters of 
orders: 







o Timing, price or quantity to trade; 
o How to manage the order after its submission, with limited or no human intervention.  
HFT will be required to register as investment firm, disclose their algorithms to the regulator 
and test them in an approved environment. MiFID II it also requires that algorithms have built in 
circuit breakers that “exit” once certain market relevant criteria are met, which means that venues 
must be able to halt trading in case of significant price movements in a harmonized fashion. 
Trading venues will also be required to have robust controls against firms providing direct market 
access in order to mitigate the risk of markets becoming disorderly, erratic price movements, and 
capacity overload. 
With MiFID II the competent authority can admittedly request information. It is expected that 
regulators on the strategies of various algorithmic traders will be enhanced, and there will be 
imposed stricter checks on arrangements whereby members of trading venues allow other firms 
employing algorithms to access public markets through their systems (direct electronic access).  
We can have some doubts about the ability of the competent authority to manage the incredible 







Chapter 2: Behavioral finance  
Behavioral finance is the outcome of a mix of sciences such as:  
i. psychology, which analyzes how processes of behavior and mind are influenced by 
physical, psychical, and external environment of human being; 
ii. finances, understood as a system of formation, distribution and use of resources; and  
iii. sociology, referred to a science that emphasizes the influence of social relations on 
people’s attitude and behavior.  
The observation that investors rarely are behaving according to the assumption made in 
traditional finance theory have lead behavioral finance growing in the last years. Behavioral 
finance is taking insights from psychological research and applying them to financial decision-
making. The models used by behavioral finance are less narrow than those based on Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. The two building 
blocks of behavioral finance are: cognitive psychology, with cognitive referring to how people 
think, and the limits of arbitrage referring to the prediction in what circumstances arbitrage forces 
will be effective, and when they won’t be. In these models, some agents are not fully rational, 
either because of preferences or because of mistaken beliefs. We are used to study the traditional 
finance which assumes that people behave in a “rational” way. But, behavioral finance is saying 
us to be careful since people are not behaving rational and there are a lot of factors affecting our 
decisions when we are investing. Note that behavioral finance is not trying to eliminate or replace 
the standard evolutions approaches, technical and markets analysis but it wants to combine the 
traditional finance findings with the investigation of social, psychological emotional aspects of 
the market.  
Therefore, we can consider behavioral finance as an integration of classical economics 
and financial theories within studies investigating psychology and decision making. In general, 
finance education can be more useful if it turns the lights on active investing by addressing 
aspects such as (i) what mistakes to avoid while investing, and (ii) what strategies in financial 
markets are likely to work in terms of earning supernormal returns.  
 In this chapter, it’s going to be analyzed the literature regarding the traditional finance 
and how behavior biases affect those theories and consequently the investment behavior. An 
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interesting point will be to analyze the point where the behavior portfolio theory it meets 
Markowitz theory.  
2.1 Traditional finance versus behavioral finance  
According to economic theories investors should behave rationally when making their 
investments. They are expecting that when investors make their decisions they will use all 
available information to form “rational expectations” about the future.  Acting rational means: a) 
when agents receive new information they update their beliefs correctly; b) given their beliefs, 
agents make choices that are consistent with Savage’s notion of Subjective Expected Utility. 
According to that, stock prices will accurately reflect the fundamental value, with a respective 
increase when there are good news and decrease when there is bad news. At these days, 
traditional finance is no longer solid, as wide cracks have opened between its theory and the 
evidence. Basically, traditional finance is not responding to the following questions: 
a. Why does an investor trade? 
b. How does an investor trades? 
c. How does an investor compose portfolios? 
d. Why do stock returns vary no due to the risk? 
The difficulties crossed by traditional paradigm have led to the emerging of the behavioral 
finance. In figure4 below there are represented the topics of investors’ financial behavior 
research.  
 
                                                 
4 Bikas, Jureviciene, Dubinskas, Novickyte (2002) 
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“Investors who always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given 
increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of 
their holding shares” was the description of Modigliani Miller (1961) for the rational investors. 
Rational investors are immune to framing errors and to cognitive errors. Normal investors, unlike 
the rational investors, are not immune to misleading information and cognitive errors. Not all 
normal investors are alike, the effects of the errors vary along the range of the knowledge of 
investor. Knowledgeable investors, through science-based knowledge, have learned to overcome 
their cognitive errors and misleading emotions. The investors that have low knowledge have 
failed to learn and some of them mistrust scientific evidence.  
Even if people are seeing the same thing they are not all interpreting in the same way, the 
observations of the same empirical evidence may be quite different. The background of the single 
person is one of the most important factors, financial market participants and researchers have 
diversified background in education, training, experience, investment objectives, available 
information, time constraints, capability of analyzing processing data etc. 
All investors, despite they are normal or rational, wants from their investments high 
returns with low risk. The three kinds of benefits wanted are: utilitarian, expressive (what it says 
this investment about me to others and to me), and emotional benefits. Utilitarian benefits of 
investments are intended as an increase of our wealth with high returns and low risk. Indeed, the 
emotional benefits are the way that investment make me feel. The benefits from emotions come 
with positive emotion such as: exuberance, hope, or pride. But, also negative emotions (fear, 
sadness and regret) even if unpleasant often are useful. In one hand, we have that perfect 
rationality cannot deal with surprises, misunderstandings, or irresolvable conflicts, in the other 
hand we have that emotions enable people to coordinate their behaviors, to find appropriate 
actions, to improve situations, and enable them to make better decisions. Therefore, emotions can 
be useful or valuable. 
Normal investors, unlike rational investors, are not willing to separate their role as 
investor from their role as consumers. As investors, they care about utilitarian benefit of 
investment. As consumers, they are interested in all the types of benefits (utilitarian, expressive 
and emotional). This implies that their investments are affected by their wants.  
14 
 
Behavioral finance is using models in which agents are not fully rational, because agents 
are driven by greed and fear, misled by extremes of emotion, whims of the crowd and subjective 
thinking. According to Shiller (1999), investors do not think and behave rationality. Normal 
people are not rational. Sometimes normal people are “normal-stupid”, affected by cognitive bias 
and sometimes they are “normal-smart”.  
When a high degree of complexity is introduced with a situation where is high risk and 
uncertainty or uncomplete information about an alternative we can’t be sure that people or 
organization will behave rational. The concept of bounded rationality is introduced. “The term 
“bounded rationality” is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the cognitive 
limitations of the decision-maker, limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity. 
Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral approach to economics, which is deeply 
concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making process influences the decisions 
that are reached”.5 
Behavioral finance can be a bridge between theory, evidence, and practice. It is trying to 
look deeper on the investors behavior, understanding why they make some types of investment 
and why they don’t some others. We can see the behavioral finance as an attempt to explain the 
“market anomalies”, to find the reason why the economic theories are not always working.  
While in traditional finance we must have portfolios designed by the rules of mean-variance 
portfolio theory, in behavioral finance we have people that design their portfolios by the rules of 
behavioral portfolio theory.  
2.1.1 Market efficiency 
What have driven the market for over 30 years is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
Theories as: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Arbitrage Pricing Theory, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
theory and the Black Scholes/Merton option pricing model are predicted in a way or another on 
the EMH. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is based on the idea of a “random walk theory”, 
which is used to characterize a price series, where all subsequent price changes represent random 
departures from previous prices According to this theory, stocks always trade at their fair value 
on stock exchanges. Simplifying, market efficiency means that “prices are right”. 
                                                 
5Simon, 1997, vol. 3, p. 291 
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The three arguments of efficient market hypothesis which rely on progressively weaken 
assumption are: i) investors are assumed to be rational and hence to value securities rationally; ii) 
some investors are not rational, but their trades are not affecting the market since are random and 
cancel each other; iii) investors are irrational in similar ways, but they will meet on the market 
rational arbitrageurs who will eliminate their influence on prices.  
  EMH it states that it’s impossible to “beat” the market, attempts to outperform the 
market are essentially a game of chance rather than one of skill, since markets are efficient and 
current prices reflect all the information. Therefore, there will not be any opportunity of arbitrage 
(no opportunity of an investment strategy that offers riskless profits at no cost). The three various 
types of efficient market hypothesis are: 
a. Weak -form efficient if prices reflect all information in past price so that no one 
can predict future price changes from knowing only past prices; 
b. Semi strong-form efficient if prices reflect all publicly available information so 
that no one can predict future prices changes using only public information; 
c. Strong-form efficient if prices reflect all available public and private information 
as soon as it is known. 
What efficient market hypothesis is stating is that markets are “informationally efficient”. 
Since all individuals can have access to available information, investments cannot be 
manipulated. Is not always true that agents access at the same time to the information, different 
lifestyle and daily routine imply different available time and method to access to information. 
Also, we have that information it may often be known first to a limited group of investors and 
then it becomes available to the public. According to Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) perfectly informationally efficient markets are an impossibility, for if markets are 
perfectly efficient, there is no profit to gathering information, in which case there would be little 
reason to trade and markets would eventually collapse. Therefore, we can see the information 
availability as a weakness of efficient market hypothesis. Behavioral finance, in this context, 
holds that stock markets are “informationally” inefficient.  
 According to EMH, factors as: experience, gender, friends and family seems to have not a 
crucial effect when making investments. Investors are treated as uniform (same interest, attitudes, 
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methods and scope), only interested in maximizing their expected utility. Therefore, emotions 
aren’t influencing their rational investing attitudes.  
Getting back to the concept of bounded rationality we can note that when applied, we can 
modify the theoretically elegant EMH to become more practical and realistic by relaxing the 
assumption of subjective expected utility theory (SEUT). In this way, instead of assuming that 
“the decision maker faces a well-defined set of alternatives to choose from”, we assume that 
alternatives are not fixed but follow some generating process as conditions change. And, instead 
of the assumption that “the decision maker is able to assign a consistent joint probability 
distribution to all future sets of events”, it will be assumed that the decision maker may estimate 
some probability of distributions without assuming the knowledge of probabilities. Considering 
as uncertain both alternatives and probability distribution about the future, the decision maker is 
unlikely to have a well-defined utility function and it will be impossible to maximize a not well-
defined utility function as SEUT assumes. Therefore, relaxing the assumption intended as limits 
of human cognitive ability for discovering alternatives, calculating their outcomes and making 
comparisons may lead the decision maker to settle for some satisficing strategy.  
Behavioral finance, on contrary of the beliefs of efficient market hypothesis, emphasizes 
the correlation of emotional reactions with market and solicit that emotions are the pillars of its 
theoretical frameworks. The key element of behavioral finance is treating the investors as human-
being rather than machines. The complicated and innovative nature of Behavioral finance it 
seems not to be widely accepted as the EMH. The reason it might be because efficient market 
hypothesis is characterized by optimism and emphasize the positive outcomes of investing 
decision making.  
2.1.2 The theory of limits to arbitrage 
If in one hand, we have Fama (the father of the view that markets are efficient) followers 
who believes that investors who try to beat the averages will inevitably fail, in the other hand, we 
have Shiller who argues that markets are often irrational and therefore beatable. A confusion is 
created when “rational markets” and “hard-to-beat markets” are lumped into “efficient markets” 
and it’s concluded that markets that are not rational are easy to beat. The difference between 
“rational markets” and “hard-to-beat markets” is that whereas prices always equal intrinsic value 
in rational markets, in hard-to-beat markets some investors (not ordinary investors) are able to 
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beat the market consistently by exploiting gaps between prices and intrinsic value. It turns out 
that both Fama and Shiller agree that markets are not always rational and both accept that 
markets are hard to beat by ordinary investors.  Since rational markets are unbeatable because 
gaps between prices and intrinsic value are absent, we cannot conclude that vice versa is also 
true. Therefore, unbeatable markets are not necessarily rational, even if prices are deviating the 
intrinsic value it might be that deviations are hard to identify in time or difficult to exploit for 
consistent excess return. Rattner concluded that: “Fortunately, Mr. Fama’s work on efficient 
markets did a favor for the small investor: it spawned low-cost index funds that replicate market 
averages. That’s where the non-expert should park his money…as the commercials say, when it 
comes to active investing, don’t try this at home”. But, small non-expert investors are not 
adopting the Rattner’s advice and traditional finance is not able to give an answer for that while 
behavioral finance does. Since small non-expert markets are fooled by cognitive errors and 
misleading emotions they continue their costly attempts to beat the market on their own or by 
hiring active money managers.  
The central paradigm of finance had been: a) the portfolio allocation based om expected 
return and risk; b) risk based asset pricing models; c) the pricing contingent claims and d) 
Modigliani Miller theorem. The anomalies that traditional finance fails to explain enters in game 
the behavioral finance which allows for explanation of financial phenomena based on non-
rational behavior amongst investors. One of the biggest goals of behavior finance it might be to 
show that where rational and irrational traders interact, irrationality can have a substantial and 
long-lived impact on prices.  
According to Friedman (1953) where there is a deviation from fundamental value there 
are two steps. First, an attractive investment opportunity is created. Second, the rational traders 
will quickly undo any dislocation caused by irrational traders, thereby correcting immediately the 
mispricing. In response to that, behavioral finance has no issue with the second step (it is hard to 
believe that when an attractive investment opportunity comes to light they are not quickly 
exploited) but it disputes the first. Behavioral finance states that isn’t an attractive investment 
created since the strategies designed to correct the mispricing can be both risky and costly. 
Therefore, mispriced assets aren’t creating an opportunity for riskless profit. In other words, 
“prices are right” it implies that there is “no free lunch” (meaning no opportunity for riskless 
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profit) but vice versa isn’t true since a deviation from fundamental value does not necessarily 
mean that there is any excess risk-adjusted average for the taking.   
The risks that have been identified related to the correction of the mispriced assets are: 
• Fundamental risk: referred to the risk that new bad information arrives after you 
have purchased the security. In theory, this risk could be perfectly hedged by 
buying a closely related product. Unfortunately, is quite impossible to remove the 
fundamental risk since substitute securities are rarely perfect. 
• Noise trader risk: referred to the risk that the mispricing being exploited by the 
arbitrageur worsens in the short run since the pessimistic trades may become even 
more pessimistic about the future. This type of risk is important since it can 
obligate arbitrageurs to liquidate their positions early, bringing them potentially 
step losses.  
So, is there any evidence that arbitrage is limited? There is reason to believe that arbitrage 
is a risky process and therefore it is only of limited effectiveness. Any example of persistent 
mispricing is immediate evidence of limited arbitrage meaning that the mispricing would quickly 
disappear if arbitrage were not limited. The only problem is that for claiming that the price of a 
security differs from its properly discounted future cash flows Fama (1970) dubbed the “joint 
hypothesis problem”. Therefore, a joint test makes it difficult to provide evidence of inefficiency.  
Notwithstanding, researchers have found several financial phenomena that are almost certainly 
mispricing, and persistent ones at that.  
2.2 Cognitive errors  
As anticipated earlier in this chapter cognitive refers to how people think. According with 
the psychology literature systematic mistakes are made by people in the way that they think. 
Cognitive errors or biases can affect all types of decision-making. The biases are relating the way 
we process information to reach decisions with the preferences we have. In certain circumstances, 
these biases can be useful. However, if they are there effects are not understood, it may lead 
investors to unhelpful or even hurtful decisions. Both private and professional investors are 
affected by these biases whose effects can be reduced only by learning to work around them. 
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Cognitive psychologists have documented many patterns regarding how people behave. Some of 
these patterns are as follows: 
Overconfidence  
Psychology searchings’ result is that humans have an inflated view of one’s own abilities, 
affecting most aspects of our lives. When researchers have asked people for their abilities only 
few of them have rated their self below the average. In other words, people tend to view the 
world in positive terms. This might be a valuable behavior, but at the same time can cause an 
ongoing source of bias in money-related decisions. There is a difference between being optimism 
and being overconfident, for example: if you believe that the stock markets will rise then you are 
optimist; if you believe that you can forecast the stock market with greater accuracy than you 
actually can, then you are overconfident. 
 The humans’ overconfidence in their judgements it appears in two forms. First, they 
assign too prejudiced confidence intervals to their estimates of quantities. Second, people are 
poorly calibrated when estimating probabilities, for example, for events that they think are 
impossible occur approximately by 20% of the time, and events that they think will occur 100% 
occur only 80% of the time. However, overconfidence manifests itself in many ways. 
Regarding investments, overconfidence have a direct impact. Traditional finance theory 
suggests not to keep all our investments concentrated in one area but diversifying our portfolio 
because doing so risk is also diversified. Since overconfident investors may overestimate their 
ability to identify winning investments, we can have as consequence investors not following the 
logic of diversified portfolio. Therefore, the weight of the advice for not concentrating the 
investments in one area it will be lower than the “misguided conviction” of overconfident 
investors. Their belief about the good prospects of a given investment, cause them to stand to 
reason that diversification is unnecessary. Thus, it will be noted a tendency to invest too much in 
what one is familiar with.  
The need for men tend to maximize their rank in the dominance hierarchy lead to greater 
overconfidence in men than women. According with Barber and Odean (2001) investors with too 
much confidence in their trading skill trade too much. The more they found that the more people 
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traded, the worse they did, on average. Thus, the more active traders earned the lowest returns. 
Hence, men are doing worse than women investors.  
 “Self-attribution bias”, “self-deception” and “hindsight bias” are other characteristics that 
feed the overconfidence. “Self-attribution” is intending that when after making their decisions 
investor face with a positive outcome, will view it as a reflection of their own abilities. But, will 
blame unsuccessful outcomes on bad lack or misfortune, rather than on their ineptitude. Doing 
this repeatedly will lead people to the pleasing but erroneous conclusion that they are very 
talented.  “Self-deception” is the process of misleading ourselves to accept as true or valid what 
we believe to be false or invalid by ignoring evidence of the contrary position, in other words 
lying ourselves in the way to avoid self-detection. Instead, “hindsight bias” is understood as the 
tendency of people to believe, after an event has occurred, that they predicted it before it 
happened. This bias can lead people to believe that an event was more predictable than it actually 
was, and can result in an oversimplification in cause and effect.  
 Base rate neglect combined with overconfidence can lead to representativeness bias.  
Base rate neglect 
Base rate neglect, also called base rate fallacy, is a cognitive error where it is noted a 
tendency for people to erroneously judge the like hood of a situation by not taking into 
consideration all relevant data but focusing excessively on new information without being 
conscious how the new information will affect the original assumption. In the other words, an 
investor exhibiting base rate neglect its placing too little weight on the base rate since he doesn’t 
consider the probability that new information fit the category into which has been placed. 
Therefore, when subjected to base rate neglect, Bayesian statics whereby individuals form base 
rate too little weight is placed on the prior probabilities (base rates) and too much on the new 
information. Base rate neglect it is the contrary of conservatism whereby the base rate is overly 
weighted.  
Representativeness bias 
With representativeness (or similarity) is intended a bias where people underweight long-
term averages, and it leads people to form probability judgements that systematically violate 
Bayes’s rule. This cognitive heuristic it reflects the case where decisions are made based on a 
21 
 
situation’s superficial characteristics rather than a detailed evolution of the reality, it involves 
making predictions about unknown outcomes based on similarity. Representativeness bias is 
essentially stereotyping,6 and via underweighting the base rate is likely to cause overreaction. A 
series of good or bad news can cause the stock market to overreact, causing several implications 
to investment decision making. Common examples of representativeness are: i) assuming that the 
past performance of an investment is an indication of its future performance; ii) assuming that 
shares in a high-profile, well-managed company will automatically be a good investment. The 
first idea, may lead investors to buy stocks that have recently increased in price. Dhar & Kumar 
(2001) investigating the price trends of stocks found that investors prefer to buy stocks that had 
recently enjoyed some positive abnormal returns, consistent with the thinking that the past price 
trend is representative of the future price trend. While, the second idea even if it sounds 
reasonable, it ignores the possibility that the shares price already reflects the quality of the 
company and thus future return prospect may be moderate. Therefore, these glamour companies 
are often poor investments.7 
Representativeness also leads to another bias, sample size neglect. Which it means that in 
cases where people do not initially know the data-generating process, they will tend to infer it too 
quickly based on too few data points. Consequently, when people judge the probability that a data 
set was generated by a particular model they often will fail to take the size of the sample into 
consideration. The belief that even small samples reflect the properties of the parent population is 
sometimes known as the “law of small numbers”.8 In the cases where the data-generating process 
is known in advance, the law of small numbers leads to gambler’s fallacy effect.  
Communal reinforcement, selective thinking, confirmation bias and self-deception 
(described above) are other psychological explanations as to why a large number of people have a 
strong belief in representativeness. The first, communal reinforcement, is intended as a social 
construction where a strong belief is formed when a claim is repeatedly asserted by members of a 
community, rather than due to existence of empirical evidence for the validity of the claim. The 
second, selective thinking, is the process by which one in order to justify a belief it ignores 
unfavorable evidence and focus only on favorable ones. Indeed, confirmation bias – a type of 
                                                 
6 Shefrin  (2005) 
7 Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny (1994) 
8 Rabin (2002) 
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selective thinking - is intended as the situation where people misinterpret evidence that goes 
against their hypothesis as actually being in their favor. 
Loss aversion  
Financial theories states that there is a trade-off between risk and return. From this point 
of view riskier investments should offer higher rates of return as compensation for higher risk. 
According with Kahnemand and Tversky’s (1979) people get utility from gains and losses in 
wealth rather that from absolute levels therefore, people are more sensitive to loss than to risk and 
return. The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes below the reference 
state) loom larger than the corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference state), so the 
losses and disadvantages have a greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages, as it 
shown on the picture below. 
 
 Some estimates suggest people weight losses more than twice as heavily as potential 
gains. Since our framework is intertemporal, people make use of more recent evidence on 
dynamic aspects of loss aversion. Consequently, the degree of loss aversion depends on prior 
gains and losses. In one hand, we have that losses are less painful than usual when coming after 
prior gains since cushioned by those. On the other hand, it is more painful than usual a loss 
coming after other losses since people became more sensitive to additional setbacks.   
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 People that try to avoid locking in a loss is another finding included on the idea of loss 
aversion.  Meaning that investors shows highly risk-averse behavior when facing a profit, but 
when they face a loss they continue to hold the investment hoping its price rises again, showing 
in this way risk tolerance or risk seeking behavior. Shefrin and Statman states through their 
theory “dispositive effect”, which is a development of the idea of loss aversion, that individuals 
tend to sell winners and hold losers, and that this tendency harmed investment returns.   
Loss aversion and risk aversion are both consequences of the status quo bias/endowment effect.  
a. Endowment effect 
The endowment effect signifies that due to loss aversion an individual value something which 
they already own more than something which they do not yet own in the sense that they demand 
more money to give up an object than they would be prepared to pay to acquire it. In other words, 
they value a good or service more once their property right has been established. Therefore, the 
loss utility associated with giving up a valued good is greater than the utility gain associated with 
receiving it. The effect it still holds even if the good or service has not been purchased but 
received as a gift. Therefore, a tendency of people to stick to their actual strategies and behavior 
and their unwillingness to change them is reflected. The reflection effect (an occurrence of 
mental accounting) is another effect which might force during the process the endowment effect.  
b. Status quo bias. 
The status quo bias is also known as conservatism. Under the status quo bias investors tend 
not to change an established behavior unless the incentive to change is compelling. Because of 
the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages the individuals have a strong 
tendency to remain at the status quo. The evidence shows that once people have formed an 
opinion, they cling to it too tightly and for too long9. “Conservatism bias” it describes the idea of 
continuing with the initial decision without considering new contradictory information. It might 
be that they adjust their position in light of new information but only partially. It has been 
showed that people are unwilling to search for evidence that contradicts their beliefs, and in the 
case, they find such evidence, they treat it with excessive skepticism. However, there are several 
                                                 
9 Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) 
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factors, such as cost of thinking, transaction costs, and psychological commitment to prior 
choices that can induce a status quo even in the absence of loss aversion.  
Conservatism bias is capable of causing the asset price to overreact or underreact to good 
news or bad news.  The status quo bias can lead to anchoring.  
Anchoring 
 Anchoring is another cognitive heuristic which describes the tendency to make decisions 
based on an initial ‘anchor’. According with Kahneman and Tversky (1974) people when 
forming their estimates often start with some initial and then adjust away from it. Experimental 
evidence shows that the adjustment is often insufficient. In other words, people “anchor” to much 
on the initial value. Therefore, anchoring could be understood as the use of irrelevant information 
as a reference for evaluating or estimating some unknown value or information. Consequently, 
the market participants with an anchoring bias tend to hold investments that have lost value 
because they have anchored their fair value estimate to the original price rather that to 
fundamentals.  
When market participants realize that their anchor is imperfect they make some attempts 
to make adjustments reflecting subsequent information and analysis. However, these adjustments 
are often nothing more than anchors of a different sort and produce outcomes that reflect the bias 
of the original anchors. Therefore, anchoring can cause the stock market to underreact to 
fundamental information. 
Availability bias  
 People often search on their memories for relevant information when judging the 
probability of an event. This procedure, even if it seems reasonable, it can produce bias since not 
all memories are equally retrievable or “available” according with Kahneman and Tversky 
(1974). The evidence shows that more recent events and more salient events will weigh more 
heavily and distort the estimate. In this way, the recently observed or experienced events strongly 
influence decisions. For example, investors are more likely to be fearful of stock market crash 
when one has occurred in the recent past.  Availability is also understood as the use of knowledge 




 People sometimes separate decisions that should, in principle, be combined. Mental 
accounting10 is the process through which people think about and evaluate their financial 
transaction. When thinking about money and risk our psychological self is separating our wealth 
into various buckets or pools. The mental accounting it might be a “downside protection” or 
“upside potential”. The downside protection mental account is designed for protection from 
poverty, which results in conservative investments designed to avoid loss. In this case we have 
investors behaving as if they are risk-averse when risk is measured by the standard deviation 
returns. While, the upside potential mental account is designed for a chance at riches, which 
results in investments in risky assets in the hope of high returns. In this case we have investors 
behaving as if they are risk-seeking when risk is measure by standard deviation of returns. 
Therefore, depending on which mental account investors are thinking they can simultaneously 
display risk-averse and risk-tolerant behavior.  
 One important feature of mental accounting is framing. According with Ritter (2003) 
framing is the notion that how a concept is presented to individuals matters. In other words, 
framing is referring to the way a problem is posed for the decision maker. Traditional finance 
recommends treating all investments as a portfolio (single pool), and consider how the risks of 
each investment offset the risks of others within the portfolio believing that people consider its 
wealth comprehensively. Behavioral finance, instead, notes that people are focusing on individual 
securities or simply their financial assets.  
 Numerous experimental studies suggest that people often appear to pay attention to 
narrowly defined gains and losses when doing their mental accounts. Two types of narrow 
framing are considered11. First, investors are getting direct utility not only from consumption, but 
also from gains and losses in the value of individual stocks that they own. Recalling the concept 
of loss aversion, here we have that the degree of painful from a loss on a particular stock it will 
depend on that stock’s prior performance. Under this form of mental accounting, called 
“individual stock accounting” we have that individual stock returns have a high mean, are more 
volatile than their underlying cash flow, and are slightly predictable in the time series. In the 
cross section, there is a large value premium. Second, investors are getting direct utility not only 
                                                 
10 Thaler (1980) 
11 Barberis, N., & Huang, M. (2001). 
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from consumption, but also from gains and losses in the value of their overall portfolio of stock. 
In this case, the degree of painful from a drop-in portfolio value will depend on portfolio’s prior 
performance. This form of narrow framing, called “portfolio accounting” is not as extreme as 
individual stock accounting. The aggregate stock returns have a high mean, excess volatility, and 
are moderately predictable in the time series, while risk-free rate is constant and low. Enlarging 
the investor’s decision frame from individual to portfolio accounting it can be noted that mean 
value falls, individual stock returns become less volatile, and they become more correlated with 
each other. Moreover, the value premium in the cross section disappears. Therefore, it could be 
said that the investor’s system of mental accounting affect assets process in a significant way.  
Procrastination 
 Procrastination refers to needlessly delaying taking an action despite being aware that 
prompt action would be better. In other words, it’s defined as the lack or absence of self-
regulated performance and the behavioral tendency to postpone what is necessary to reach a goal. 
Procrastination it is not just a problem of time management but a complex process that involves 
affective, cognitive, and behavioral components. Being that people are preferring more comfort 
activities or to avoid emotional distress and therefore inclined to cling (together with endowment 
effect) to their existing portfolio rather than to sell stocks, procrastination it affects in particular 
way financial planning and investment strategies. Procrastination it may avoided to some extent 
by simplification. Moreover, adequate default rules will help investors as they are not obliged to 
take actions rather than stick to “take it as it comes”.  
Herding 
 The herd behavior is the tendency of some individuals to mimic the actions (rational or 
irrational) of a larger group. In other words, following the “main stream” which is being 
represented by a peer group or a pear leader, doing so they ignore signs and indicators that would 
lead them to different assessments of the actual situation, given a rational behavior. Under 
herding bias, it is notes a natural tendency of individuals to simplify complex decision taking 
processes leading them to just copy decision of others. The reasons why herd behavior its showed 
may be different. The first is the social pressure of conformity, showed by people who are very 
sociable and have a strong desire to be accepted by a group, rather than be branded as an outcast. 
Consequently, following the group it might be an ideal way of becoming a member. The second 
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is the common rationale, that it is unlikely that such a large group could be wrong. This is more 
frequent in the case where an individual has very little experience. The individual follows the 
heard believing that they know something that he doesn’t, even if he is convinced that that 
particular idea or action is irrational or incorrect. A strong herd mentality can even affect 
financial professionals. The investment strategy based on herding is not very profitable. Investors 
affected by this bias, constantly buy and sell their investment assets in chase of the newest and 
hottest investment trends. But, buying and selling frequently it incurs in substantial amount of 
transaction cost, which can eat away available profits. Moreover, entering the position correctly 
when a trend is starting is extremely difficult, since by the time the investor has known about the 
newest trend, most other investors have already take advantage of this news. Herding can, also, 
lead to bubbles and crashes in markets.  
 Therefore, even if in general groups are used to make decision to benefit from the range 
of knowledge and experience, the desire for social acceptance may encourage individuals with 
conflicting views to fall into line or those with opposing views may start to doubt their own 
convictions. It has been showed that groups of unrelated persons, crowds, are often able to 
identify correct answers to problems. This because it is a wider range of knowledge and 
experience and individuals give their opinion independently of the opinions of others. Therefore, 
we can deduce that for group behavior being positive it is needed to make sure that the committee 
is appropriately diverse because if both heads think in the same way than two head aren’t better 
than one. And, individuals must be encouraged to give their own opinions rather than following 
the views expressed by one or a few dominant individuals.  
2.3 Behavioral portfolio theory 
 Economist have been motivated to develop alternative models by observing the human 
behavior because of the failure of the classical expected utility theory (EUT). For several 
decades, Markowitz’s Mean Variance Theory (MTV) has been considered as the starting point of 
modern portfolio theories. Mean variance investors choose portfolios by considering mean and 
variance. The variance, portfolio risk, depends on the correlation between the returns of the assets 
in the portfolio. The covariance and the correlation coefficient provide a measure of the way the 
two assets move together. The portfolio with least risk will be the portfolio that has the minimum 
variance that is the portfolio composed of the risky assets that has the smallest deviation. The 
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mean-variance theory, considered as construction theory, provides the necessary tools to 
construct a portfolio for investors who only cares about the expected returns of their portfolios 
and their risks. The mean-variance it prescribes the optimal mean-variance portfolio to investors 
who accept its assumptions.  
According with Shefrin and Statman (2000), the behavioral portfolio theory optimal 
portfolio is typically not mean-variance efficient, since when confronting the behavioral portfolio 
efficient frontier with the mean-variance efficient frontier they didn’t coincide. They developed 
the behavioral portfolio theory on the foundation of SP/A theory (Lopes (1987)) and prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Both SP/A theory and prospect theory are theories of 
choice under uncertainty.  
The SP/A theory was developed by Lopes as a psychological theory of choice under 
uncertainty. It can be regarded as an extension of the safety-first portfolio model. Investors in 
safety-first portfolio theory aim to minimize Pr {W < s}, the probability to ruin.12 In other words, 
when investors wealth W falls short of a subsistence level s the investor is ruined. Under 
normally distributed returns in Roy’s safety-first model an investor chooses a portfolio P to 
minimize the objective function: (s- µp)/σp. Therefore, safety first is a general concern about 
avoiding low levels of wealth. According with Roy, even if the returns are not normally 
distributed the same objective function is applied since all optimal safety-first portfolios lies on 
the mean-variance frontier. But, according with Shefrin and Statman, this is not true since 
optimal safety-first portfolios are not mean-variance efficient. In SP/A theory, the S stands for 
security (analogous to safety in safety-first), P for potential (a general desire for reaching high 
levels of wealth), and A for aspiration (a generalization of the safety-first concept of reaching a 
specific target value, such as s). In Lopes’ framework, fear and hope are the two emotions that 
operate on the willingness to take risk. Fear is underlying the concern for security, and underlies 
the concern for potential. In one hand, fear operates through an overweighting of the probabilities 
attached to the worst outcomes relative to the best outcomes, in this case individuals are acting as 
if they were excessively pessimistic when computing E(W). In other words, individuals 
understate the probability of achieving the highest level of expected utility. On the other hand, 
hope has the inverse effect of fear, optimism causes hopeful investors to overstate the probability 
of achieving the highest level of expected wealth. Lopes concluded that emotions of fear and 
                                                 
12 Roy (1952) 
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hope reside within all individuals, and that each emotion serves to modify the decumulative 
weighting function D.13 She suggests that the final shape of the decumulative transformation 
function h is a convex combination (shaped like a smile) of hs (for fearful investors worried 
about security) and hp (for hopeful investors looking for maximum potential), reflecting the 
relative strength of each. 
The second theory used as a foundation for the behavioral portfolio theory is the prospect 
theory from Kahneman-Tversky. This theory describes how individuals make a choice between 
probabilistic alternatives where risk is involved and the probability of different outcomes is 
unknown and it tries to capture people’s attitude to risky gambles as parsimoniously as possible. 
Kahneman-Tversky argued that normative approaches are doomed to failure, because people 
routinely make choices that are simply impossible to justify on normative grounds, in that they 
violate dominance or invariance. Prospect theory also simultaneously explains preferences for 
insurance and for buying lottery tickets. Prospect theory can explain mental accounting which it’s 
combined with the Lopes’ SP/A theory for developing the behavioral portfolio theory. 
2.3.1 Behavioral portfolio with a single account version (BTP/SA) and 
behavioral portfolio theory with multiple accounts (BTP/MA) 
Shefrin and Statman presented two versions of behavioral portfolio theory. First, a single 
mental account behavioral portfolio theory (BTP-SA) which considers the portfolio as whole. 
The framework of BTP-SA is like portfolio selection in mean-variance framework. The BTP-SA 
frontier is obtained by maximizing Eh(W) for fixed Pr {W < s}, where Eh(W) is the expected 
value of W under the transformed decumulative function h(D). BTP-SA investors select the 
optimal portfolio along the BPT-SA efficient frontier by maximizing U (Eh(W), D(A)), where 
D(A) is the probability that the payoff will be A or higher, and corresponds to Pr {W < s} on the 
safety-first model. Under the behavioral portfolio theory with multiple accounts (BTP-MA) 
investors, in contrast with the BTP-SA, isolate their portfolios into mental accounts and overlook 
covariance among mental accounts. As described above, mental accounting is the tendency of 
people to separate decision that should, in principle, be combined. Investors have different level 
of aspirations, there are some that have low aspirations and others that have high aspirations. But, 
                                                 
13 The decumulative weighted function is basically 1 - cumulative distribution function, it measures the curve to the 
right (instead of the left) of a given point. 
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most of them are trying to combine low and high aspirations, doing in this way they want to 
avoid poverty and want also a shot at riches. Shefrin and Statman watched the BTP-MA as a 
layered pyramid, with each layer a separate mental account, where the bottom layer is designed to 
avoid poverty which results in conservative investments, and a top layer designed for a shot at 
riches which results in investments in risky assets in the hope of high returns.  Therefore, 
investors in their portfolio will have bonds for their low aspirations, which resemble risk-free or 
investment grade bonds, and lottery tickets for the high aspirations which resemble speculative 
(junk) bonds.  
 Shefrin and Statman concluded that investors in BTP/MA match mental accounting with 
goals and their mental accounting are desegregated. Consequently, it might be that they combine 
a short position in a security in one layer with a long position in the same security in another 
layer. In other words, investors may borrow for leverage in their aspiration accounts, while lend 
in their low aspiration accounts. 
.  
2.3.2 Where behavioral portfolio theory meets Markowitz theory  
 As it noted above, Shefrin and Statman (2000) showed that the BTP optimal portfolio is 
typically not mean-variance efficient. In the recent years have been some studies providing some 
evidence that some features of behavioral portfolio theory and mean-variance theory almost make 
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their assets allocations coincide, but this evidence have not been sufficient to conclude that 
investors can use BTP and MVT interchangeably. The assumption of normally distributed stock 
returns it was the weakness of all these studies. A study made on 2016 by Pfiffelmann, Roger and 
Buorachnikova try to find the point where the behavioral portfolio theory meets the Markowitz 
theory.  
 For constructing their model, they used the dataset of the daily stock prices of 1,452 U.S. 
stocks from the CRSP database for the period 1995-2011. Since BPT investors determines their 
optimal portfolio by maximizing an objective function based on subjective expected portfolio 
returns, they assumed a single period economy and generate a series of expected returns from 
historical returns. They built a set of 100,000 portfolios and added a limit of 80 of the stocks than 
an individual can hold, ensuring in this way a good level of portfolio diversification. Two 
situations were considered. First situation, the investors cannot short stocks. In this case, for a 
good diversification among different portfolios it was needed to generate portfolios with different 
number of stocks and different weight distributions. Second situation, short sales are possible. In 
this case, the algorithm generates portfolios that contain more stocks that they do when sales are 
constrained.  
For determining the optimal behavioral portfolio and allocating it in the mean-variance 
space, they made an empirical estimation of the efficient frontier with the generated portfolios. It 
was checked, for each portfolio, if there was another portfolio with a higher expected return and a 
lower variance. If no other portfolio in the sample with that characteristics was found than the 
portfolio was considered to be located on the efficient frontier. The behavioral portfolio theory 
optimal portfolio satisfies the sequent function: max Eπ(W) u.c.p (W<A) < α, where W is the 
final wealth distribution of the investor, A is the aspiration level and α the acceptable probability 
of ruin. The set of portfolios that satisfies this constraint is denoted by S*. The S* portfolio that 
maximizes the expected return with subjective decision weights Eπ(W) = y’π (with y equal to the 
value of portfolio and π as the vector of decision making), is the BTP optimal portfolio. Checking 
whereas this portfolio was part of the set of portfolios located on efficient frontier Sef was the 
final step. It was found that the Shefrin and Statman’s portfolio it was mean-variance efficient in 
over 70% of cases. In their model, Shefrin and Statman, consider an investor who transforms 
probabilities into decision making, but investors also make decisions based on change of wealth 
rather than on total wealth and can exhibit risk-seeking behavior when faced with losses. 
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Therefore, individuals determine the subjective value of each monetary outcome via a value 
function. Their aim was to check if the same results occur for a Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(CPT) investor who subjectively transforms monetary outcomes via a value function. Hence, the 
BPTCPT optimal portfolio is the portfolio that maximizes the inner product Eπ [v(W)] = v’?̅? 
(where v is the vector of modified outcomes, the vector of decision making has also been 
modified).  It was showed that this new portfolio leads to similar results in terms of mean-
variance efficiency. Despite the assumption were different, they showed that mean-variance 
theory and behavioral portfolio theory lead to similar portfolios in the mean-variance space.  
 The way investors define their optimal BTP and BTPCPT portfolios leads to portfolios 
characterized by a high level of risk and a high level of returns. Investors initially satisfy the 
safety-first criteria, deciding whether will invest and enter the market. Then, investors use 
probability weighting to invest remaining wealth in securities characterized by a high potential 
payoff. Consequently, the BPT optimal portfolio is absent during financial crisis. It was noted 
that for almost entire period of study these portfolios displayed highly positive skewed returns.   
Another investigation made by Pfiffelmann, Roger and Buorachnikova was to find 
whether efficient BPT and BPTCPT would be chosen by typical Markowitz investors by 
examining the location of these portfolios on the mean-variance efficient frontier. They found 
that the typical Markowitz investors would typically avoid investing in such portfolios, because 
these portfolios having high level of risk and high return lie on the extreme upper right part of the 
frontier. And, the risk aversion coefficient associated to BTP and BTP CPT optimal portfolios are 
up to 10 times lower than the degree of risk aversion shown by typical individual mean-variance 
investors. Investor that exhibit risk-seeking behavior when potentially high gains are reachable 
and are attracted by positively skewed returns will chose the BPT and BPTCPT portfolios. 
2.4 Behavioral asset pricing models  
 Asset pricing models can be characterized as theoretical or empirical. The first, begin with 
theoretical for investor preferences as well as investor cognitive errors, and misleading emotions 
and proceed with an examination of empirical evidence about associations between asset returns 
and features reflecting preferences, cognitive errors and misleading emotions. Indeed, the second, 
make the inverse, it stars with empirical evidence and proceed with an examination of possible 
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theoretical rationales for the associations. Market efficiency, explained above, must be tested 
jointly with an asset pricing model, such as the CAPM or the three-factor model. 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), is the traditionally asset pricing model widely used for the pricing of risky securities. 
CAPM, built on Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio theory with the added assumption that all 
investors accept the mean-variance prescription, defines the trade-off between the existent risk 
and the expected returns. According with this model, an investment should be taken if the 
expected return meet or beat the required return, and the expected return is defined as the rate on 
a risk-free security plus a risk premium. The results for all the different risks (betas) are plotted 
on the security market line. Indeed, Fama-French three-factor model expand the CAPM by 
adding size and value to the market risk factor in CAPM. Therefore, if in CAPM the expected 
returns are presented as a function of the objective risk, which is based on the probability 
distribution of investment outcomes, in the three-factor model the expected returns are presented 
as a function of beta, a measure of objective risk, but also as a functions of market capitalization 
and book-to-market ratios. But, how if non-rationality/ cognitive errors affecting these models?   
 There is a considerable evidence that affects play a role in pricing. When we hear a name 
of a stock, before thinking about its price-to-earning ration or the growth of it’s company’s sales, 
we admire or despise it just by the feeling that occurs rapidly and automatically, often without 
consciousness. According with Statman, Fisher, and Anginer (2008), affects mislead the investors 
to favor stocks of admired companies exuding positive affect over stocks of despise companies 
exuding negative affect even when the expected returns of admired companies’ stocks are lower 
than the expected returns of despise companies’ stocks. Statman (1999) described a behavioral 
asset-pricing model that includes utilitarian factors, such as risk, but also expressive or affect 
characteristics. Where the utilitarian benefits are including low risk and high liquidity, and 
expressive and emotional benefits are including the virtue of socially responsible mutual funds, 
the prestige of hedge funds, and the trill of trading. As noted before, emotions can be useful or 
valuable, and the reliance on emotions will increase with the complexity of information and with 
stress. Since stocks are especially complex and their evaluation is stressful the emotions plays a 
crucial role, even if investors try to overcome emotions/affects through a systematic examination 
of relevant information. There are two types of affects, integral affect and incidental affect, that 
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influence the decision-making of investors. The first, is associated with the characteristics of a 
particular object, and the second it arises from an unrelated event.  
 Statman, Fisher, and Anginer (2008) developed a four-factor analysis. They showed that 
companies in the admired portfolios have lower objective risk than companies in the despised 
portfolios, and the characteristic of small, value and low short-term momentum are associated 
with the despised portfolios. Two factors of behavioral asset pricing model are the objective risk 
measured by beta and the subjective risk measured by affects. The expected return, under the 
behavioral asset pricing model, are high when objective risk is high, and also when subjective 
risk is high. Whether the CAPM, based completely on objective risk, it expects a positive 
correlation between risk and expected return (the higher the risks the higher the expected return), 
in behavioral asset pricing model, which considers also the subjective risk, this correlation it’s 
expected to be negative. This indicates that investors assessment of risk reflects subjective risk 
associated with affect. Hence, when affect is positive benefits are judged high and risk is judged 
low, and if affect is negative benefits are judged low and risk high. Therefore, markets with high 
expected returns were perceived to have low risk. Short-term momentum is another factor of this 
analysis, which is positively correlated with affects and generally is associated with high returns. 
But, this association is not due to the role of short-term momentum as a proxy for affect. Since, 
either market capitalization is positively correlated with affects but generally is associated with 
low returns. It was also noted that if the effects of typical investors on stock returns are nullified 




Chapter 3: Risk tolerance  
Cognitive biases have a crucial importance in defining the risk profile of a client. 
Therefore, in this chapter, there will be an analyzation of the literature regarding the risk 
tolerance in the first part. While in the second and third part, there will be an analyzation of the 
measurement of risk tolerance and how MiFID questionnaire is designed.   
3.1 Literature review 
In the rational theories, Von Neumann Morgenstern developed the theory that measured 
how much an individual is desirous of return by the size of the risk he is willing to take for 
getting it. MIFID legislator, which was explained in the first chapter of this thesis, among the 
information that intermediaries must obtain it includes the client’s risk propensity and risk profile 
in order to comply with the suitability requirement when providing financial advice or portfolio 
management. Another important legislation that has the power to impose the advisors to 
understand a client’s risk tolerance is the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which enforces the “know your client” rule. 
 In order to avoid client mistrust and create a solid relationship between client and 
intermediary it must be identified the accurate client’s risk attitude. Where risk attitude is defined 
as a psychological attitude, which regards the individual’s economic and financial position.14 In 
other words, the risk attitude is the risk one chooses to incur.  Indeed, the risk tolerance of a client 
is defined as the level of financial risk that an investor is willing to take. Grable (2008) defined 
the financial risk tolerance as the maximum uncertainty someone is willing to accept when 
making a financial decision, and (Irwin, 1993) defined it as the willingness to engage in a 
financial behavior in which the outcomes are uncertain with the possibility of an identifiable loss. 
Moreover, Gibson (2013), defined the financial risk tolerance as a comfort level that an 
individual is willing to accept while risking their current wealth for future growth.  Financial 
advisors, by accurately assessing risk tolerance, can properly allocate a client’s portfolio and 
balance the client’s perceived trade-off between risk and return. According with Callan and 
Johnson (2002), understanding the risk tolerance can be instrumental for identifying any 
mismatches between a client’s psychological and financial needs. Even if sometimes the risk 
                                                 
14 Cordell, 2001  
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tolerance might be considered as the risk aversion formulated by classical economic theories, the 
most recent contribution refers to a more structured definition which combines the classical 
notion of risk aversion with risk propensity, risk attitude, risk capacity and risk knowledge. 
Where risk propensity is understood as the investor’s financial decisions or allocation 
predisposition. Risk capacity refers to how much risk one can afford to incur, and risk knowledge 
measure how well an investor understands both risk and the risk/return tradeoff.  
Individuals having different levels of financial risk tolerance are expected to act 
differently when making investment decisions, and those having a high level of risk tolerance, 
i.e., low aversion risk, are investing more aggressively. The risk tolerance is also influencing the 
way individuals invest their resources for short- and long-term objectives, such as saving for a 
significant purchase and retirement. The measure of risk tolerance has had a particular attention 
not only in the field of economists but also in the field of finance, business, natural hazard and 
natural and man-made disasters. In the recent times, the idea of better understanding the risk 
tolerance a household financial and costumer psychological perspective. The researches of all 
fields through normative and descriptive models have searched to clarify the likelihood of taking 
risks, and outcomes form risky actions. While the first normative model is the Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT), the descriptive models are based on behavioral and/or psychological viewpoint.  
The EUT developed by Von Neuman and Morgenstern suggested that customers should 
select choices with the highest expected outcomes. Weber and William (1997) stated that risk 
preference, in the expected utility framework, is operationalized as risk attitudes that are 
descriptive labels for the shape of the utility function presumed to underlie a person’s choices, 
and a person will be classified as risk averse if he/she choices sure amount of money over a 
lottery with equal expected value. As noted early, the expected utility theory in its basis is 
assuming that consumers are rational and the risk preference remains constant over time. 
Consequently, a consumer, despite the situation or event, is expected to make the same choice in 
terms of riskiness. An extension of EUT was originated by Markowitz (1952), the so-called 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), which predicts that investors should be willing to take 
additional risk if the return associated with the risk is high. It has been showed by Hanna and 
Chen (1997) that risk aversion has little impact for consumers investing for the long run, but it 
makes a significant difference for those investing with shorter time horizon. Being that the utility 
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function shape is measured using an individual’s response to a series of hypothetical income 
gamblers, the risk tolerance is important within the Expected Utility function. 
Researches of psychologies, behavioral sciences and financial planning have pointed out 
some discrepancies with EUT, even if the Expected Utility Theory has been a favorite method for 
conceptualizing risk tolerance and risk-taking behaviors. Furthermore, it has been showed that 
“few people have a constant risk aversion throughput the entire domain of wealth”.15 Damasio 
(1994) in respect with the traditional economic theories states that to obtain the best results the 
emotion must be kept out. However, the emotions don’t necessary damage the thoughtful 
decision-making. Some empirical studies have shown that investors having difficulties in 
associating their emotions with decision make very poor decisions in some context and take risk 
even when they result in disastrous losses. As noted before, the behavioral finance argues that 
investors are not fully rational and the cognitive bias ca be used to explain the deviations from 
fully rationality. According with behavioral economists, risk is multi-dimensional and it’s 
affected by psychological characteristics, emotional factors and cognitive limitations. However, 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch (2001) observed limitation of both classical economics 
and behavioral finance, since the decision making under uncertainty was based also on the 
affective response rather that only on “cognitive/rational” assessment of the risk. Therefore, they 
proposed the “risk-as-feelings hypothesis” which relies on the concept that emotions often 
overcome rationality when taking decisions under uncertainty. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is 
positioning in the front the notion that emotional reaction to risky situations often diverge from 
reasoned assessments, and when this is happening emotional reaction, such as worry, fear, dread, 
and anxiety, directly influence behavior. Consequently, the framework of risk-as-feeling it helps 
to better understand both risk tolerance and risk-taking behaviors.  
Affective and cognitive aspects make the perceived risk different from the objective risk. 
Therefore, all the cognitive errors explained in the chapter two can lead to a different perception 
of risk. According with MacGregor (2000), also the positive or negative judgement based on 
mental association, that has nothing to do with the economic or financial assessment, may affect 
the risk perception. Risk tolerance is also changing according to the context. Consequently, the 
people’s actual attitude to financial risk must be measure explicitly in the financial context.  
                                                 
15 Friedman and Savage, 1948 
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 Two are the categories including the tools used to discover the risk attitude and risk 
preference. While the first category relies on economic/quantitative measurement, the second is 
based on psychology and psychometrics.  
The quantitative analysis techniques, based on the specification of a utility function and 
on the estimation of the parameters for that function, is the foundation of economic/quantitative 
approach. The parameters of the estimation for the utility function correspond to risk aversion 
and to a subjective discount rate. The data collected for these estimates it might be from 
controlled experiments (where people make hypothetical choices within an appropriately 
designed context), or from an uncontrolled environment or by survey data. One of the most 
popular tools for making these estimates is the Multiple Price List (MPL)16. The main vantage of 
MPL is that it is transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. 
People are asked to make a series of consecutive choices between two outcomes, where the 
expected value of one outcome increases at a higher rate than the other. It is used as a measure of 
risk aversion the point where an individual switch from choosing one outcome over the other.  
The theory and technique of psychological measurement, which includes the 
measurement of knowledge, abilities, attitudes and personality traits, are the basis of 
psychological approach. In the 1960s, Zuckerman developed the “sensation-seeking scale” with 
the purpose of better understanding personality traits such as neuroticism, antisocial behavior, 
and psychopathy. The questionnaire was designed by Zuckerman for measuring how much 
instigation a person demands and the degree to which he/she enjoys the enthusiasm. This 
questionnaire, through investigating individual’s past experiences and their goals with respect to 
the future, can be used to assess their attitude to take risk. Another psychological approach is the 
“Iowa Gambling Task” (IGT), which is a psychological task thought to simulate real-life decision 
making. IGT was originally used to analyze the ability to choose of patients with prefrontal 
lesions and orbital cortex, because of their incapacity of remembering the past events they will 
choose randomly and make decisions without benefiting from past experience. However, this 
approach applied to decision-making process, by measuring the “somatic signals”17 experienced 
by people when making the choice, it allows to obtain an unbiased measure of their risk aversion. 
Then this measure can be brought into comparison with the self-assessed risk attitude and their 
                                                 
16 Holt and Laury, 2002 
17 Damasio in the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) assumed that somato-visceral from the body (affective 
reactions) ordinarily guide individuals’ decision-making and risk engagement process.   
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real risk attitude in the real-life choices of people. Characteristics as self-confidence, difficulties 
in representing oneself, socio-demographic characteristics, and the expected returns associated 
with a certain self-representation will determine, according with Lucarelli and Brighetti (2010 
and 2011), the gaps between these measures (simulate real-life decision making versus real-life 
decision making). Expect in the situations of crisis or bubbles in financial markets where 
emotions wake up as a sorting of sleeping factor and gain the upper hand leading to excessive 
risk-taking, it was noted that in normal condition individual would take financial risk based on 
self-assessment rather than emotional tolerance of risk.18 It was also observed that investors who 
makes use of advisory service would seem to be more balanced on taking risk than investors 
making choices autonomously.   
Psychometrics also suggest some test for measuring the validity and reliability of a 
questionnaire. The first is verified by calculating the correlation between the measure obtained 
through the questionnaire and the measure of other relevant instruments, so-called concurrent 
validity test. Indeed, the questionnaire is reliable according with Roszkowski (2005) when it 
measures a construct consistently across time, individuals, and situations. Reliability is connected 
to the margin of error of the measurement, which depends on how many questions there are 
(smaller the number of questions less reliable is the questionnaire) and how clearly are written. 
The concept of clearness is important since questions related to a complex subject such as 
investment choices can lead to misunderstanding and confusion.   
3.2 The determinants of risk tolerance 
 As mention before the factors affecting the risk tolerance are: age, gender, marital status, 
education, financial knowledge, and income. The two more influential factors on risk tolerance 
are education and financial knowledge. However, following these factors will be explained 
briefly.  
Age 
Different studies have lead to different results regarding to the effect that age has on risk 
tolerance level. However, it was widely accepted that the hypothesis of costant life-cycle risk 
aversion is not true. Different age groups are showing different choice of investemnt. Wang and 
                                                 
18 Lucarelli, 2011 
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Hanna, noted that the effect that age has on the risk tolerance increases as the ages increases. 
Also, Gramble (2000) stated that older persons would be more risk tolerant that younger persons. 
Instead, the findings of the Morin and Suarez’s (1983) stated the contrary, risk aversion is 
increasing with age and therefore risk tolerance will decrease as age increases. According with 
Riley and Chow (1992), and Hallahan, Faff, McKenzie (2004 and 2009), there is a not-linear 
relationship between age and relationship, finding which was support also by Lucarelli and 
Brighetti, (2010). It was noted that the level of the risk self-evaluation was mainly the same until 
60 years of age and then this level sharply decreases.19 A reason it might be the self-confidence, 
which is decreasing at the end of normal working activity life cycle. Lucarelli and Brighetti also 
find that the trend of the emotional risk attraction it shows high levels in the under-30 cluster then 
it reaches the lowest level when actual financial choice is the highest (the 30-45 cluster) and then, 
unpredictably, it increases regularly and sharply arriving at the top for individuals over 60-years. 
It seems that individuals in retirement are more risk-seeking in their behavior.  But, since in real 
life retired people can recognize the interests of a prudent behavior, it can be deduced from the 
low level of the risk self-evaluation for over-60 years that their unbiased attraction risk is strongly 
unconscious.  
Gender  
 Gender in contrast with age is less debatable, in general all agree that males are more risk 
tolerant than females. Sung and Hanna (1996) made an estimation on the effects of financial and 
demographic variables on the risk tolerance for household with an employed and found that 
households headed by a female member are less risk tolerant in comparison to a male head or a 
married couple. According with Barber and Odean (2001), the reason why male are more risk 
tolerant that women is simply due to the overconfidence since when it comes to investing men 
are more confident that women. Indeed, Powell and Ansic (1997) found through a computer-
based experiment that females regardless of the degree of familiarity, frame or cost have a lower 
level of risk tolerance (higher risk aversion). Comparing the ratio of risky assets to net worth for 
the same age categories Coleman (2003) found that there was no significant difference for 
women and men younger than 40 years, instead for the age over 40 years women had a lower 
ratio than men in the same age category. Lucarelli and Brighetti (2010) confirmed that females 
tend to assume real life decisions at a level of risk much lower than men, but surprisingly females 
                                                 
19 Luccarelli and Brighetti, (2010). 
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emotional risk attraction is somewhat higher than those of males if females are considering 
themselves as someone who is risk averse and takes very cautions financial decisions. The 
reasons why researchers have concluded that men are more risk tolerant that women have been 
diverse, for example Chen and Volpe (2002) suggested that this may because individual’s 
understanding of financial knowledge, while Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) argue that this might be 
since women are more exposed to poverty when they are older than men because their 
accumulated wealth doesn’t reach those of males.  
Marital status 
 Marital status because of its interaction with gender and age has been increasing the 
interest of the researchers. There are some controversial conclusions according to the 
effect/influence that marriage status has on the level of financial risk tolerance. While, Grable 
(2000) has concluded in his study that married respondents were more risk tolerant than single 
respondents. Hallahan, Faff, and McKenzie (2004), Yao (2004), and Fan and Xiao (2000) have 
stated that single individuals are more financial risk tolerant, and the reason it might be the 
tendency that married individuals have greater need for wealth protection. Increased 
responsibilities that are accompanying marriage and children will have as consequence the 
reduction of risk tolerance level.20 The estimation made by Luccarelli and Brighetti, (2010) have 
shown that there is a distinction between single individuals and widowed or divorced people. 
While the first possess the lowest capability may however, even if their emotional risk attraction 
is not noticeable relevant, develop a high self-evaluation of risk tolerance with corresponding 
high financial risk choices in real life. Whereas the second, widowed and divorced people, show 
the highest level of emotional risk attraction even if they reveal a good capacity.  
Education  
 Education is a very important factor in understanding the process of an investment and 
therefore the risks it brings. According with Grable (2000), respondents with higher attained 
education were more risk tolerant than others. Different other studies have also shown that a 
higher level of achieved education tends to increase an individual’s capacity to evaluate risks 
intrinsic to the investment process and therefore endows them with a higher financial risk 
tolerance. in general, almost all researchers concluded that education was positively correlated 
                                                 
20 Daly and Wilson (2001) 
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with risk tolerance. It was also found by Bellante and Green (2004) that differences in education 
level accounted for larger variations in asset allocation more than any other variable they 
examined. Instead, Hallan, Faff and Mckenzie (2003 and 2004) stated that education, as marital 
status, have no significance in explaining the individuals risk attitude.  
Financial knowledge 
 The behavior of an individual is obviously influenced by its knowledge. Two important 
components of financial knowledge are: objective knowledge and subjective knowledge. The first 
it might be understood as what an individual actually know (accurate stored information), while 
the second is an inclusion of individuals degrees of confidence in his/her knowledge (belief about 
that state of knowledge). These two categories are affecting in different way the behavior. A high 
level of objective knowledge induces investors to employ a category based process, in this way 
they could process the information at category level rather than based on individual attributes. 
While, subjective knowledge is confidence-driven, evaluating newly information acquired with 
the confidence of knowing. Different researches have proposed an interplay between these two 
categories of financial knowledge, since a positive relationship exist between objective 
knowledge and self-accessed knowledge the result is that objective knowledge may enhance the 
subjective knowledge. Wang (2009) showed that investors objective knowledge, subjective 
knowledge and risk taking are highly correlated.  
 According with Chen and Volpe (1998) financial knowledge is affected by factors such 
as: age, gender, and amount of experience. Grable (2000) concluded that respondents with higher 
level of financial knowledge were more risk tolerant that respondents with less knowledge. 
Instead, Davey (2004) suggested that educating the individual investors about financial market 
and instruments will not necessarily increase their financial risk tolerance since even the most 
knowledgeable and educated individual could potentially have a low risk tolerance. 
Income  
  As for the gender, there is widely accepted that income has a positive correlation with risk 
tolerance. a greater level of wealth ensures access to more resources for investment and serves as 
a cushion against caprices of financial markets. Therefore, a higher level of income should 
encourage greater risk tolerance.  
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Table 121 is a summarize of the determinants of risk tolerance and the way they are 
affecting it. As noted the widespread consensus is for gender and income. All researchers in their 
results seems to agree that: i) males are more confident and undertake riskier behaviors than 
females; ii) a higher income induces people to be risk seekers.  
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21 Lucarelli and Brighetti, (2010). “Risk tolerance in financial decision making”. Springer, 2010. 
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3.3 Measuring risk tolerance 
 Given the presence of uncertainties on the financial markets, researchers and policy 
makers have considered the assessment of risk tolerance in the process of financial decision-
making as an important factor. For this reason, researchers have long been interested in 
understanding the relationship between personal financial risk tolerance and factors as diverse as 
the life cycle and asset allocation choice decisions. However, the role of risk tolerance is not seen 
in the same way by all the stakeholders involved in the regulatory reform of financial services 
industry.  
 Regulators are increasingly taking steps to bring the financial services industry to 
fiduciary standards. In order to achieve this goal, they are requiring advisors to utilize method 
that justify the suitability of their recommendations. Being that the objective of regulators is 
achieve prudent investment management standards, they are also requiring to advisors to measure 
the risk tolerance of their client. On the other hand, investors need to mitigate adverse reactions 
to market oscillations, therefore they need valid and reliable estimates of risk tolerance.  
 Even if an accurately and efficiently measure of financial risk tolerance has been seen as a 
significant component of the financial counseling and planning process their supporters haven’t 
agree on an unanimously method for measuring an individual’s tolerance for investment risk. 
Therefore, there have been diverse ways for measuring the financial risk tolerance. A popular 
method for assessing the financial risk tolerance have been the Utility Theory. However, as noted 
early the utility theory cannot adequately represent the risk-taking preference and tolerance 
because according with Statman (1995) people tend to be consistently more willing to take risks 
when certain losses are anticipated, and are more willing to settle for sure gain when absolute 
gains ate anticipated. Given the difficulty of measuring and assessing the individuals risk 
tolerance some researches have suggested to only focus on the objective risk measurement. But, 
as noted before people are not acting rational and the asset allocation is a result of personal 
choice rather than the advice of a third party. Consequently, objective measures tend to be 
descriptive rather than predictive, do not account for the multidimensional nature of risk, and 
often fail to explain actual behavior. 
In order to assess the financial risk tolerance, the literature suggested that at least five 
elements must be included: i) some central concept of risk; ii) relevance to respondents; iii) 
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allowance for the derivation of a risk measure; iv) ease of administration; and v) adequate 
validity and reliability. 
3.3.1 The Survey of Consumers Finance Risk-Tolerance Item and the 
multidimensional risk measure 
For obtaining an estimate of an individual’s willingness to engage in risky financial 
behaviors a “multidimensional risk measure”22 has been used.  This measure is especially useful 
for researchers using large dataset or for generating the estimates of risk aversion as an extension 
of expected utility theory. However, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and a 13-item 
financial risk-tolerance scale23 have been more extensively used for assessing the financial risk 
tolerance since they are: i) available in the public domain, ii) easy to administer, and iii) 
relatively easily for responders to answer.  
 The Survey of Consumers Finance Risk-Tolerance Item 
This survey attempted to measure risk tolerance directly through a combination of closed- 
and open-ended questions. Among family and consumer economists and personal finance 
researchers there is a question that continues to be used widely in most surveys for assessing the 
willingness of individuals to take financial risks. The question reads:  
Which of the following statements on this page come closest to the amount of financial risk that 
you are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
1. Take substantial financial risk expecting to earn substantial returns. 
2. Take above average financial risk expecting to earn above average returns.  
3. Take average financial risk expecting to earn average returns.  
4. Not willing to take any financial risk. 
There are several factors that have made this question so popular: i) the item is one of the 
only risk-tolerance questions asked in national surveys of consumers; ii) the wide use have been 
associated to high degree of validity measure. 24 However, the popularity of this measure has not 
gone without criticism. For example, Hanna, Gutter, and Fan (2001) criticized the fact that the 
survey of consumer finances question was “not rigorously linked to the concept of risk tolerance 
                                                 
22 Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997); Hanna and Lindamood (2004); 
23 The 13-item financial risk-tolerance was developed by Gramble and Lytton (1999); 
24 Grable and Schumm (2007) 
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in economic theory”. Instead, Gramble and Lytton (2001) conducted a study to determine the 
current validity of the item. By making a comparison between the 13-item risk tolerance measure 
and the SCF item they found that item does not fully represent the spectrum of financial risk 
tolerance and the measure was most likely a proxy for the narrower aspects of investment risk 
tolerance within the broader concept of financial risk tolerance. Gramble and Schumm (2007) 
conducted a study to examine the SCF item’s reliability by performing five tests in an effort. 
With reliability understood as how free an item or scale is from measurement error, in other 
words how consistent is a measure from one use to another. They concluded that the reliability of 
the single-item measure tends to be “relatively low”. However, Gramble and Schumm doesn’t 
rejected the use of the item based on the reliability test but finished saying that researches 
whenever use the SCF item should take prudent measures to account for standard error variance. 
A multidimensional risk measure  
 Gramble and Lytton (1999) began the development of a measure that would 
consider multiple dimensions of financial risk measure. It was started from the method of Babbie 
(1983) which included 100 items, then were removed the question than measured construct other 
than financial risk tolerance (e.g., preferences for general risk seeking, tolerances for physical 
pain, etc.) and arriving in this way at 50 questions. Then it was collected data to conduct bivariate 
and multivariate item analyses to examine relationships between the remaining 50 assessment 
items. Therefore, all the question that showed inconsistency in correlation’s and those having a 
very strong relationship between items were eliminated from the pool of items, in this way the 
bivariate item analysis lead to 30 assessment items. Then, the multivariate item analysis it 
removed other 10 questions by conducted two tests: i) was eliminated each item that offered 
respondents a risk-free alternative or a non-response choice; ii) index scores were developed for 
each respondent using the remaining items. The final set of 20 question was measuring eight 
dimensions of risk, including: guaranteed versus probable gambles, general risk choice, choice 
between sure loss and sure gain, risk as experience and knowledge, risk as level of comfort, 
speculative risk, prospect theory, and investment risk.  
Later a principal component factor analysis was performed on the 20 items to further 
investigate the issue of multidimensionality in the instruments and to assure a parsimonious 
measure. The purpose of this factor was to reduce and summarize data by identifying the 
underlying, or common interrelationships, which can then be conceptually explained as factors. 
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The result was a 13-item measure that tests the constructs of investment risk, risk comfort and 
experience, and speculative risk. It was also conducted a test of reliability by comparing scale 
scores to the SCF measure. Gramble and Lytton (1999) concluded that financial service 
providers, educators, and researchers are encouraged to use the instrument as a tool for quickly 
and accurately assessing the financial risk tolerances of clients and other respondents. 
3.3.2 The five-factor model for measuring risk tolerance  
 During the financial crisis, a lot of criticism were made to the risk tolerance 
questionnaires since it was noted that they do not work as advertised. It was also noted that the 
current risk tolerance questionnaires were not consistent with one other. Therefore, Holzhauer, 
Lu, McLeod, and Wang (2016) made a study in order to obtain a more valid and reliable model 
for measuring risk tolerance. They used the factor analysis in the framework of the multi-item 
approach originally developed by Churchill (1979), since this approach was very useful for 
decreasing measurement difficulties for four reasons: i) the specificity of items can be averaged 
out; ii) precise distinctions can be made about clients; iii) reliability tends to increase; and iv) 
measurement error decreases.  
 They used the definition of risk tolerance defined by Cordell (2001) - the risk tolerance is 
a combination of four risk tolerance factors: risk propensity, risk attitude, risk capacity and risk 
knowledge. Therefore, they compared the Cordell’s four factors to the risk tolerance they isolated 
using factor analysis. Other than the four factor of Cordell they included a variety of questions to 
test for other potential risk tolerance factors established in academic literature.  
In this model, it was also taken account of the prospect theory by Kahnneman and 
Tversky (1979 and 1984) by including questions referring to the three pervasive effects that they 
listed as violations of expected utility theory and by controlling the behavior that the investor’s 
wealth is changing compared to the investor’s reference wealth rather than how much wealth an 
investor has. The list of the violations of expected theory by Kahnneman and Tversky was as 
follows: i) the reflection effect states that investors do not weight gains; ii) the isolation effect 
states that investors often disregard components that alternatives share; iii) the certainty effects 
states that investors may overweight probable outcomes.  
 Holzhauer, Lu, McLeod, and Wang (2016) developed an 85-item risk tolerance 
questionnaire categorized into five-factors based on the four factors in Cordell (2001) and an 
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additional personality factor. The questions were structured in this way: from 1 to 48 were 
referred to risk attitude factor, from 49 to 55 to risk propensity factor, from 56 to 66 to risk 
personality factor, from 68 to 70 to risk knowledge factor, and from 74 to 84 to risk capacity 
factor. Instead, the question 67 and 71 to 73 are referred demographic variables and the question 
82 to 85 to dependent variables, those questions are not used in the factor analysis but were 
included in this model to obtain dependent variables for multiple linear regression analysis and 
for future research opportunities. 
 The goal of this model was to isolate the factors that influence the risk tolerance by 
performing the factor analysis on the risk tolerance questionnaire. Therefore, they eliminated the 
variables that cross-load on more than one factor and those variables that do not load highly on 
any specific factor. Thus, factor analysis reduced the questions from 85 to 25 questions. 
Holzhauer, Lu, McLeod, and Wang (2016) model for measuring the risk tolerance was called 
riskTRACK, the acronym TRACK was used to collectively identify the five individual risk 
factors that they found for measuring risk tolerance: traditional risk factor, reflective risk factor, 
allocation risk factor, capacity risk factor and knowledge risk factor. In addition to factor 
analysis, validity and reliability check were accessed to ensure that the five riskTRACK factors 
are robust.  
 3.4 Designing a questionnaire 
 Empirical studies have shown that financial investments, career paths, and health 
practices which are considered as choices under uncertainty have as common weakness the 
inability to take into account heterogeneity in preferences. Some studies, in order to take account 
of this heterogeneity have developed a quantitative proxy for risk tolerance based on responses 
from a large- scale survey.  
According with Holzhauer and McLeod (2009) risk tolerance is identifies by five factors: 
generic risk attitude, risk capacity, loss aversion, risk knowledge and risk preferences. Therefore, 
for a questionnaire being valid each of these factors must be measured separately, including also 
the investment time horizon and investment objectives. It is necessary identifying with respect to 
each item the relevant questions, finding the right balance between reliability and the need for 
brevity. Where reliability is needed to be positively correlated with the number of questions. Here 
enters into the game the quantitative techniques which are a good help for making possible the 
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selection of questions on the basis of their significance and correlation with the quantity to be 
measured. While variable such as race, age, and gender are easily plotted, it is not the same for all 
questions. For example, wealth and income are only measured with a certain degree of 
approximation. Instead, overconfidence can only be proxied. The way questions are written is 
very important since wording can influence the reliability of questionnaires. Therefore, the 
questions must be clear and comprehensible and also must contain the errors in perception which 
might be driven by behavioral biases and cognitive distortions.  
3.4.1 Questionnaire according with MiFID 
 The main objective of MiFID is to further integrate the European financial markets, for 
reaching this objective an appropriate level of transparency and information as well as investor 
protection against the complexity of the market is needed to be guaranteed. The confidence that 
consumers has on the financial markets is determined by the approach that financial firms follow 
for selling financial products and services. Successively, the consumer confidence in financial 
markets has implications for financial system stability as well as investor protection. Therefore, 
financial firms before selling any financial product or service to consumers have been 
considering the preferences and need of their clients. The function of revealing the consumer’s 
needs and preference is a work of questionnaires. From this point of view, questionnaires may be 
seen as a better know one’s client and as a tool for reducing the misunderstanding and as a 
protection for financial firms against possible complaints in the case of an unexpected loss. For 
firms providing investment services with the introduction of MiFID this practice become 
compulsory.   
 Thus, for avoiding the misunderstandings in the matter of Know Your Customer regime 
the investments firms when providing product and/or services to the clients should differentiate 
between two types of assessments to be undertaken: suitability and appropriateness test. To 
assess the suitability of financial instruments recommended to customers MiFID II is identifying 
the information that intermediaries must obtain in the cases they are providing investment advice 
or portfolio managements. MiFID directive requires that the products or services offered to a 
client must be appropriate and suitable. Where suitability is understood as the degree to which the 
product or service matches the client’s situation, investment objectives, level tolerance, financial 
need, knowledge and experience. Instead, appropriateness is a sub-case of the suitability and is 
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defined as the point where the product or service offered by the intermediary matches the retail 
client’s knowledge.   
 
The points where suitability and appropriateness differ are as following: the field of 
application, the set of information, and operational effect. Regarding the first the advised 
services, investment services and portfolio management, a suitability questionnaire is needed 
while for non-advised services an appropriateness questionnaire is needed. The difference is also 
noted on the set of information required to the client. While the suitability questionnaire should 
be deeper and organized in three sections: the first dedicated to the investment objectives of the 
client, the second with focus on the financial capacity of client and it is linked with his financial 
ability to incur risk, and the third is intended to examine the experience and knowledge of the 
client aiming to understand if the client is able to recognize the risks absorbed in the product or 
investment service offered or demanded. The other field where suitability and appropriateness 
questionnaires is the compulsoriness (or not). The suitability questionnaire is compulsory 
meaning that it is a preliminary test of knowledge the firm cannot do without since it works as 
stopping step for the service provision. Instead, the appropriateness questionnaire is not a 
compulsory questionnaire. In this case if the client doesn’t provide the needed information or the 












information is incomplete/insufficient the firm is required to signal to the client that they cannot 
determine if the product or service is appropriate being that they are not in possess of the 
necessary information. Therefore, if the client refuses to give some information, the service may 
be provided all the same, but under disclosure obligation by firm.   
Summarizing, the type of information required for a suitability test is as following: i) 
client’s knowledge and experience; ii) overall financial situation; iii) investment objectives; and 
iv) other relevant circumstances. Instead, the information required for an appropriateness test is 
only point one of suitability test Client’s knowledge and experience with regard to: a) the types of 
service, transaction and financial instrument with which the client is familiar; b) the nature, 
volume, and frequency of the client's transactions in financial instruments and the period over 
which they have been carried out; c) the level of education, and profession or relevant former 
profession of the client or potential client. In the following section, a deeper look will be given to 
these information’s.  
3.4.1.1 Suitability and appropriateness 
As anticipated early, the suitability test should be performed by investment firms when 
offering a service or transaction that involves an element of recommendation such as: 
investments advice or discretionary portfolio management. The article 19 (4) of MiFID states that 
intermediaries must obtain “the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the 
investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, his financial situation and his 
investment objectives”. 
The client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience 
 The article 37(1) of directive 2006/73/EC (so-called MiFID Level II directive) states that 
“the information regarding a client's or potential client's knowledge and experience in the 
investment field includes the following, to the extent appropriate to the nature of the client, the 
nature and extent of the service to be provided and the type of product or transaction envisaged 
including their complexity and the risks involved: 
a. the types of service, transaction and financial instrument with which the client is familiar; 
b. the nature, volume, and frequency of the client's transactions in financial instruments and 
the period over which they have been carried out; 
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c. the level of education, and profession or relevant former profession of the client or 
potential client”. 
The purpose of point (a) of this directive is to estimate the ability of the clients to understand 
the risks in all their dimensions that are correlated with a certain investment and the related 
consequences. In the cases where clients overestimate their financial knowledge or are taciturn in 
admitting their lack or learning the answers of the questions designed to evaluate knowledge of 
specific financial instruments may be unreliable. The elements differing the suitability 
requirements are as follows: type of investment, client’s classification, and type of financial 
intermediary.  
According to the type of investment provided it is the defined the level of knowledge 
required. The advice services – portfolio management and investment advice – are the services 
with greater protection to the client, wider information exchange and risk tolerance assessment.  
Depending on while a client is “retail client” or a “professional client” the amount of 
information required is changing. While for retail clients (not a defined category / not 
professional clients) the sources of information are more numerous, for professional clients 
(clients who possess the experience, knowledge and expertise to make decisions and properly 
assess the risks that incurs) the data requirements are more essential.  The professional clients are 
expected to be able to identify by themselves the information that is necessary for them to make 
an informed decision, and to ask the service provider to provide that information. Retail clients, 
not being able to identify what type of information they need for making their investment 
decision, are more protected by legislation. Therefore, depending on the client classification a 
different treatment is foreseen. A firm when providing a product or service is given permission to 
assume that a professional client has the necessary experience and knowledge for understanding 
the risk associated to the investment services or transaction, or types of investment, for which 
they are classified as a professional client. In this case, the service provider has no duty to collect 
the information needed to judge if an investment is appropriate or not, but has the duty to warn 
the client if he is about to make an investment decision that the firms actually knows it to be an 
inappropriate decision. 
There are also some differences regarding the financial services sector: banking, securities 
and insurance. Whereas for the insurance sector there is only a partial application of MiFID 
suitability, for banks and financial firms, instead, a full application is required.  
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Regarding to point (b) “the nature, volume, and frequency of the client's transactions in 
financial instruments and the period over which they have been carried out” behavior finance 
studies have shown that besides experience the outcome of past information also matters. It has 
been notices that more experience associated with past positive results can lead to overconfidence 
and optimism, consequently clients are more willing to take risk without considering their risk 
capacity. Hence, for determining a clearer picture of consumer’s perception of his/her experience 
it is important also evaluating his/her overconfidence and optimism.  
The point (c) “the level of education, and profession or relevant former profession of the 
client or potential client” are the only socio-demographic characteristics which MiFID legislative 
takes into consideration. Characteristics such as: client’s age, gender, current and expected 
household composition, and planned retirement age, which are excluded by MiFID are taken into 
consideration by economic literature arguing that such characteristics affect investment choices, 
both in terms of their impact on risk attitude as well as the constraints on risk capacity.  
After receiving all the information provided by the client the firm is expected to warn the 
client or potential client if it considers that the product or service is not appropriate to this client 
or potential client.  
The client’s or potential client’s financial situation  
 The article 35 (3) of the directive 2006/73/EC states that the information on the client’s 
financial situation could include “information on the source and extent of his regular income, his 
assets, including liquid assets, investments and real property, and his regular financial 
commitments”. 
As seen before, income and wealth have a significant effect on risk tolerance. 
Consequently, they require particular attention when evaluating the client’s financial capacity, 
income and wealth also require to be measured precisely in order to overcome any possible 
reticence and to mitigate any consequential errors of measurement. It has been suggested from 
empirical studies to consider the income of entire household rather than just the individual’s 
income. This because the spending and investment choices of individuals are also depending on 
the level and distribution of total income among family members. Therefore, also factors such as: 
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the household’s significant expenses, factors having an impact on the regularity of income, and 
factors affecting the background risk should be taken into consideration.   
Investment objectives 
 In the section of investment objectives, the client has to express his/her preferences 
regarding the holding period and the risk profile of the investment that is going to make, this for 
recognizing those investment products that matches his/her preferences about risk, return and 
length of time. Three are the most important elements of the investment objective: i) holding 
period; b) risk propensity and risk profile; c) purpose of the investment.  
 Factors such as: expected return objective, investor’s degree of impatience, and the 
foreseen need for liquidity are crucial in determining the holding period. Therefore, such element 
should be assessed to appreciate how reasonable the holding period is. For example, in cases 
where the client has a high degree of impatience his expectation of return in the holding period 
are unrealistic or at least incompatible with the market conditions and/or liquidity needs and/or 
client’s risk tolerance.  
 For European regulation, the difference between risk profile and risk preferences is not 
that clear. In the sense that MiFID is making a distinction between the preferences regarding risk 
taking and the client’s risk profile but does not explicitly specific the meaning of each of them 
and is not giving any indication on how measuring these variables. While “risk preference” may 
refer to the preferences in investing in a financial instrument with a given risk-return 
characteristics. In other words, it is related to the risk and return characteristics of the investment 
that the client is willing to undergo, in other terms the objective-risk. Instead, the “risk profile” 
may refer to the emotional capacity to assume risk, the so-called risk subjective. The legislation 
by including both risk profile and risk preferences on the section of investment objectives it 
seems to agree with the prevailing industry method which in literature is criticized because it 
confuses and overlaps the assessment of risk tolerance with the evaluations of other elements 
when formulating an investment recommendation.  
 As noted before the third element of investment objectives is the purpose of investment. 
The traditional economic theories suggest that the single investment choices should be picked in 
a process of global portfolio optimization. As noticed in the chapter two of this thesis the 
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behavioral bias such as for example: loss aversion and mental accounting have an important 
impact on what investor consider to be an efficient portfolio. For a better assessment of 
individual’s attitude in adopting safer or riskier investment strategies is fundamental 
understanding how extreme are these biases and how ambitious the goals and their time horizons 
are.  
Once again, the two tests appear to be significantly diverse regarding the implications that 
have for financial firms. While, the appropriateness test, provides that clients receive the required 
warnings, will never impose limitations on the trading for clients, the failure to pass the 
suitability test may represent a serious obstacle to the client being handled by a portfolio 
manager. 
3.4.2 The supervisory authority point of view 
 Supervisors authorities are paying a particular attention to the questionnaires used by 
intermediaries. The Autoritè des marches financiers (AMF), has a made a study by using as 
benchmark a “standard” questionnaire based on the quantitative measurement. They found that 
the tools used by intermediaries are unreliable, meaning that firms are often are collecting 
irrelevant information, also these questionnaires result to be inconsistent since they profile the 
same client in different ways.  
 The Financial Services Authority (FSA), instead, focuses on how firms establish and 
check the level of investment risk that retail clients are willing and able to take in the wider 
context of the overall suitability assessment. FSA and European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) have been publishing guidelines on assessing the suitability of questionnaires. From 
analyzing the evidence FSA has observed that: i) from 11 risk-profiling tools reviewed 9 of them 
were so weak as to invalidate client classification, ii) there are critical weakness in how risk 
categories are described, and iii) the asset-allocation procedures are not strong enough. On these 
points, the FSA indicates poor and good practices. According with FSA guidelines when 
assessing the risk, a customer is willing and able to take firms should ensure that have been taken 
consideration the customer’s capacity for loss, the responses of customer to questions should be 
appropriately interpreted and weighted, also the wording of questionnaires must be fear, clear and 
nor misleading. Therefore, The Financial Services Authority emphases that the investment 
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recommendations must be based on a complete and thorough knowledge of the products and 
should be consistent with the diversification principle.  
The guidelines published by ESMA, which concern certain aspects of assessing 
suitability, are detailing the information that the intermediaries should collect and define the 
principles on which client classification, product classification and asset allocation procedures 
should be based, without focusing on the methods of assessment of risk attitude. These guidelines 
were produced since the supervisory authority noted that the tools used by intermediaries when 
gathering information about clients and when classifying financial products were representing 
critical shortcomings. According with European Securities and Markets Authority guidelines, the 
investment firms must help investors understand the importance of information and encourage 
them to provide information as accurately and completely as possible. Concerning the risk profile 
procedure, ESMA states that the internal policies must help investment firms understanding the 
fundamental facts about the client and the features of the financial instruments available for that 
client. Instead, with reference to the amount of information gathered a certain amount of 
discretion is left to the firms, which should adopt a principle of proportionality regarding the 
service offered, the characteristics of product, and the amount of the investment. ESMA 
guidelines affirms that intermediaries must consider not only the suitability assessment but also 
the reliability of the information collected. Therefore, the investment firms according with these 
guidelines should at least define procedures that guarantee orderly and transparent record-keeping 
concerning the suitability assessment process.  
3.4.3 The reliability and validity of questionnaires used by Italian investment 
firms 
 Several shortcomings are noted when analyzing the questionnaires used by Italian 
investment firms. The more important is referring to the risk tolerance assessment where in most 
of cases is deduced only by requesting the risk-return expectations for the future investments with 
respect to hypothetical investment situations. These questionnaires are prepared and based on 
business model of investment firm, the characteristics of the products offered and the level of 
knowledge of the staff involved in the assessment and recommendation process, without 
considering the past financial investments and current financial constraints. As a result, a client 
could be classified differently by different firms.  A study was made by Linciano and Soccorso, 
which partly overlaps and partly extend the work made by Marinelli and Mazzoli (2010), 
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analyzing a sample of 20 questionnaires regarding the way they are structured and given and to 
the contents and certain reliability features. 
 Linciano and Soccorso (2012) examined: i) how investment firms were defining the 
questionnaires; ii) what validity and reliability checks were done; iii) how the questionnaires 
were administrated; and iv) how the clients’ profile was updated. They found that: 
• 14 out of 20 investment firms prepare their questionnaires internally without involving 
specific professional figures; 
• Referring to the validity test, 14 out 20 banks states that have undertaken it but not all 
firms performed a pilot test; 
• Only three banks provide the distinction between questionnaires for professional and 
retail clients, the others were making a difference regarding whereas the client was legal 
person or natural person; 
• Even if investment firms are organizing specific training for staff managing 
questionnaires, in most cases training doesn’t include modules expressively devoted to the 
questionnaires and almost never make explicit reference to the potentially significant 
cognitive behavioral bias; 
• No bank was imposing limits regarding to the frequency updates of the client profiles, but 
some were checking that the frequency of updating is not anomalous.  
• Most questionnaires have question which are relevant for suitability assessment such as: 
question on preferences in terms of time horizon and investment objectives.  
 
Regarding the validity test, it was checked whether the client’s risk attitude and financial 
capacity had been identifying as distinct items by different questionnaires or questions. instead, 
regarding the reliability test it was examined: the number of questions, the layout (format and 
reading features), the structure (was checked the presence of introduction and the way question 
were grouped by subject area and by degree of complexity), question type (quantitative versus 
qualitative; closed versus open-ended and open-ended guided), and wording (it should be simple 
and not ambiguous). By investigating these aspects it was found that: i) the layout does not 
always clearly identify the sections or areas reserved for the answers; ii) even if the literature 
suggest to place the sociometric questions at the end, almost all the questionnaires open with 
them, however since these questionnaires are generally not overly long probably this is not 
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affecting the outcomes of the interview, iii) the section dedicated to experience and knowledge 
represented the most critical shortcomings, since none of questionnaires contain questions 
designed to test knowledge of basic notions. 
Linciano and Soccorso (2012) concluded by saying that only 2 out of 20 questionnaires 
examined can be considered sufficiently clear, effective and “valid”, since they precise and 
unambiguous questions.   
 3.5 Financial literacy and overconfidence as determinates for financial advice 
seeking 
 The European regulatory framework wants to prevent poor financial outcomes and for 
this purpose it encourages the development of independent and high-quality advice services. 
Investor education and financial advice have been on the center of the regulation; however, their 
effectiveness may be challenged by individuals’ behavior and reactions. Gentile, Linciano, and 
Soccorso (2016) analyzed the relationship between the propensity to seek for professional advice, 
financial knowledge and self-confidence, as well as the determinants of financial knowledge and 
self-confidence. Given that investor education might exacerbate overconfidence and given that 
higher levels of knowledge can go along with a higher attitude towards behavioral biases a 
special attention is needed to be payed to the interaction between self-confidence, financial 
literacy and the propensity to seek for advice. If in one hand we have that higher levels may 
improve one’s own perception of his/her abilities, possibly raising overconfidence by 
exacerbating the gap between self-assessed and actual competencies. On the other hand, higher 
levels of knowledge may reduce the attitude to overstate one’s own competencies, thus 
decreasing overconfidence. 
 The studies suggest the following relationship between the financial literacy and retail 
investors: 
➢ It has been noted that the women are less literate than men, and this isn’t depending on 
the country of residence, marital status, age, education level, and their possible role as 
decision makers. Women also appears less confident that men and more conscious of their 
own limits;   




➢ A higher risk tolerance and more patience is noted on high financially literate individuals; 
➢ Financial experience is positively associated to financial knowledge.  
Instead, the overconfidence can be defined as the unmotivated confidence in one’s own 
knowledge and abilities. As noticed early, the overconfidence can significantly affect financial 
decisions by raising risk taking because of upward biased forecast, and by feeding the belief of 
beating the market or being more informed than others. Therefore, the effects that overconfidence 
has on financial advice seeking are crucial. It has been noticed that overconfidence may 
discourage advice seeking and that overconfident investors are inclined to accept suggestions 
from friends and relatives, the so-called informal advice. This tendency to rely on informal 
advice is more frequent among men, individuals with lower financial knowledge and higher self-
confidence, declaring to have experienced a worsening of their economic conditions and to have 
difficulties in saving. 
The determinants of demand for advice are multiple. Theoretical and empirical literature has 
shown that the financial seeking is more frequently among financially sophisticated individuals. 
However, not all agree on this result, others have shown that there is a negative or an 
insignificant relationship between literacy and propensity to ask for professional help.  
The disaccord on the result have push to further investigation. Some researchers have focused 
on the interaction between financial literacy and behavioral biases showing that behavior biases 
can drive sub-optimal choices. Behavioral attitudes and biases may be relevant determinants of 
financial competence, since they may distort risk perception and, by this way, trigger mistaken 
investment choices in spite of knowledge. Therefore, to avoid investment mistakes, the 
knowledge alone may be insufficient. For example, framing do play a role in portfolio choices, as 
shown before, and in advice seeking. Also, regret aversion combined with low-literacy, in cases 
where investors are anticipating the possibility of advisors to highlight mistakes in their previous 
decisions, may deteriorate from demanding for professional help.  
Other researchers have focused on socio-demographic variables showing that wealth and age 
have a positive effect on advice seeking. Instead, gender, education, self-employment and 
experience may have ambiguous effects, which may increase the willingness to rely an expert or 
decrease it as well as no relation at all. Other factors determining the demand for advice may be 
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the trust in advisors, the appreciation of consultants’ competencies and the impression by 
advisors’ perceived experience, language, jargon and confidence in judgements.  
Gentile, Linciano, and Soccorso (2016) results show that the regulation of financial advice is 
not enough to protect investors who need it most. Most consumers in Italy illustrate a very low 
degree of financial knowledge and competency and a strong attitude towards informal advice. 
Therefore, the key to the investors’ correct access and use the predicted tools for helping them in 
making good financial decisions is the financial education, which may be implemented through 
investor education programs focused on the investment decision processes, the relationship with 
the subjects involved and the rules predicted to protect investors in every step of such process. A 
special attention, in order to prevent unwanted reactions potentially hampering the investors 




Chapter 4: Neurofinance  
 Over millions of years Homo sapiens have evolved and adapted certain brain mechanisms 
which are largely maladaptive for today’s complex world of trade and finance.25 Our autonomic 
processes were evolved through natural selection, but unfortunately some of these adaptive traits 
serve us poorly in navigating in the today’s complexities of economics. As mentioned early in the 
theories guiding us in the investment world were focused on rational expectations, thus assuming 
that on average human beings are able to properly weight the probabilities of future outcomes and 
form a logical conclusion as to the appropriate decisions to undertake. In this way, rational 
expectations are also assuming that economic actors possess the requisite cognitive capacity to 
make such calculations without taking into considerations the innate complexity in employing 
such an algorithm.  
However, as noted on the chapter two, behavioral finance in the past twenty years has 
made progresses in introducing theories regarding the way human behaviors are affecting 
investment decisions. Unlike the rationalists, who assumed the optimal behavior as predicted by 
expected utility theory, the behaviorists first observed actual behavior and subsequently drew 
conclusions as to the appropriate axioms to describe revealed actions and choices. The evidence 
suggesting that human beings are not acting as predicted by expected utility theory is growing 
day by day. What once it was considered as irrational today is simply considered as human. 
In 1759, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, the philosopher Adman Smith showed what 
today psychology and neuroscience is discovering, i.e. human beings are struggling between 
“passions”, which are describing our wanting’s, and “impartial speculator” describing our 
uniquely-human prefrontal brain regions which have the ability to suppress our more reptilian 
instinct. Therefore, the diversity of human behavior is characterized by the interaction between 
wanting’s and the parental override of our prefrontal cortex.  
 In order to understand how people are making economic decisions behavior finance have 
developed a new field from the findings by psychology and neurology, the so-called 
neurofinance. This new science is looking inside the brain for having a more realistic model of 
decision-making, and for explaining in a better way the individuals’ economic behavior and their 
                                                 
25 The fundamental human dilemma described by Shermer (2007) 
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effects translated into aggregate market phenomena. The science of neurology is teaching that 
specific brain structures are responsible for different characteristics of human behavior, and that 
the actual behaviors and decisions of individuals are depending on the interaction between brain 
regions. Thus, introducing sciences of psychology and neurology can lead to a better 
understanding of actual behaviors, particular with respect to economic decision making. 
Economist have taken advantage by the findings of neuroscience – which discovered that a 
significant portion of human behavior is dictated by brain processes which take place largely 
away from our consciousness (automatic mechanisms) – to try to explain why human behavior 
defies the prediction made by rational choice models. The consequence of these attempts was the 
field of neuroeconomics. 
Rocha (2011), based on knowledge provided by neurosciences, proposed a 
neuroeconomic based decision-making model (represented in the figure below) that is dependent 
on the evaluation of expected rewards and risks in two decision spaces: the personal decision 




4.1 Neurofinance and financial decision making   
In economics, the concept of expected utility describes a process by which a rational 
agent makes economic decisions in the presence of uncertainty, considering not only the expected 
outcome, but its variance as well. According to that, an individual will only assume a risky 
gamble if its expected utility exceeds the utility one derives from an alternative riskless outcome, 
also known as a certainty equivalent. Expected utility theory is also assuming that an economic 
agent knows with certainty the relevant outcomes and their associated probabilities. Neurofinance 
is showing, contradicting the traditional finances theories like Efficient Market Hypothesis, that 
investors use different strategies to make their trading decisions instead of behaving as an ideal 
rational decision maker. Therefore, neurofinance is considering that investors do not always try to 
maximize their profits and the emotional influence on decision- making has been proposed to 
explain the irrationality of the investor’s decision.  
The financial collapse of many large companies was caused by a liquidity shortfall from 
US subprime lending system. Consequently, in the mid 2007 world started to face the financial 
crisis, from which we are still recovering. The classical economic theories, which assumes that a 
rational agent has emotion as enemy, were tested by US subprime crisis, and this crisis have 
shown that investors are not acting like models such as Markowitz, CAPM etc. are assuming. It 
has been noted that emotions have an important role in financial decision making, their influence 
have used to explain the deviation from optimization. According with Rocha (2011), the market 
sentiments (financial market emotions) are influenced by numerous factors such as market 
indices, expert decisions, government decisions, etc.  
Neurofinance from this point of view is a rapidly advancing field which uses the neural 
mechanisms in order to better understand the dynamics of decision making in normal times as 
well as crisis. While financial theories consider benefit assessment as an analytical variable 
neurofinance consider them as a subjective variable, function of dopaminergic circuits. Instead, 
the risk assessment is including both quantitative and qualitative components. Neurofinance want 
to estimate the risk in circumstances where the information about the probability of occurrence of 
the events is limited and the opportunity for analytical analysis is imaginary. In other words, what 
matters for neurofinance isn’t the expected return or the probability of loss but the subjective 
evaluation reward provided by the expected return and the perception about the intensity and the 
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likelihood of the losses. According to that neurofinance shows that the relationship between 
perception of the benefit and risk, as well as the relation between stock and its reliability towards 
markets are determining the attractiveness of a stock.  Thus, the intention to trade is a complex 
psychological construct that requires estimating benefit and risk of acting in order action 
suitability to be calculated.  
The intention or the willingness of trading is calculated by neurons that collect all the 
pieces of information calculating by different areas of brain. Some of these areas are involved in 
calculating risks and benefits, while others are in charge of evaluating conflict generated by these 
perceptions of benefit and risk that determines the cognitive effort for making a decision.  
In the following section, there will be represented some techniques for measuring cerebral 
activity. 
4.1.1 The electroencephalogram (EEG) and the functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) 
The heuristics described by behavioral finance may be justified from a neural perspective 
as a rational tradeoff between the benefits of deliberation and the biological costs associated with 
such deliberation. Neurofinance is one of the interdisciplinary areas that combines neuroscience 
knowledge and techniques to investigate the psychology of neural circuits that are engaged in the 
decisions that investors have to make. A distinguish is made between experimental techniques 
that studies human brain by how cerebral activity is measured. These techniques use advance 
statics in order to allow researchers to make judgement about brain functionality. By using the 
science of neurobiology which studies the nervous system, it can be taken pictures of specific 
parts of the brain while a decision is being made and this give an insight of what is going on in 
the brain. 
Scientific advances in the field of electrophysiology and human genetic analysis 
combined with sophisticated experimental techniques from cognitive psychology allow 
neuroscientist and psychologist to address abstract questions, such as how human cognition and 
emotion are mapped to specific neural substrates. The electroencephalogram (EEG) and 
magnetoencephalogram (MEG) are the most ancient techniques used to map the brain, these 
techniques are measuring the electrical or magnetical fields by ionic currents generated at the 
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neurons involved in a given brain processing. Instead, the more recent techniques are measuring 
the magnetic field variation caused by movements of water molecules that were disturbed by a 
very strong and short magnetic field perturbation. A static picture of the brains anatomy is 
provided by this technique, named Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) which is used to disclose 
possible brain lesions, or functional MRI (fMRI) used to identify brain areas that are activated 
during a given brain processing. By using these imaging and measurement tools, experiments can 
be conducted to determine how human cognition and emotion are mapped during decision-
making.  
In general, the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments have to be 
done is special facilities (hospitals) since fMRI uses strong magnetic field perturbations and 
depends on very sensitive sensors. A very precise information is provided by statistical analysis 
about sets of neurons activated at both cortical and subcortical areas during a given processing. 
For providing reliable information about these areas, statistical analysis requires at least two 
seconds of data sampling because fMRI has a very low temporal resolution given that 
measurements are about blood influx transients. According with the studies that uses fMRI the 
process of financial decision making is involving the participation of areas such as: the 
orbitofrontal cortex (COB), the medical prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the amygdala, insula, the 
nucleus accumbens (NAC), Striatum (Str) and other neural structures. 26  For example, according 
with Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) risky choices as well as risk-seeking choices are preceded by 
the activation of nucleus accumbens, instead the activation of anterior insula preceded riskless 
choices as well as risk-aversion mistakes.  
The sets of neurons activated at different cortical areas is generating the weighted sum of 
electric currents, which is the electric activity recorded by a set of electrodes ei (EEG). The EEG 
recorded activity is used by LORETA (Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography), 
which is a technique that aims to calculate the location of the sets si of neurons activated during a 
brain processing. Correlation analysis is providing information about the different sets of neurons 
enrolled in solving a given cognitive task. Three different patterns of brain activity (P1, P2 and P3) 
are identified by the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which discloses the quantification of 
                                                 
26 McClure (2004); Breiter (2001); Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004); Camerer and Loewenstein 
(2004); Kuhnen and Knutson (2005); Knutson (2003 and 2007).  
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information patterns that are associated with the activity of the different neural circuits involved 
in decision making.27  
 The first pattern is proposed to observe the activity of the neural circuits engaged 
in recognizing the possible problem solutions and evaluating their associated risks 
and benefits; 
 For observing the activity of neural circuits engaged in calculating the action 
adequacy, fairness and willingness considering the results calculated by first 
pattern neural networks, the third pattern is proposed;  
 Pattern two, instead, is proposed for observing the activity of the executive neural 
systems in charge to trigger decision making process and selecting the action to be 
implemented considering information provided by pattern one and pattern three 
neural networks.  
The electroencephalogram (EEG) has a high temporal resolution and a reasonable spatial 
discrimination to localize sets of neurons located at the cortex, but not subcortical areas. 
Therefore, the neurofinance choices this technique if the purposed of the experiment is to 
understand the cortical activity associated with the financial decision making, but a combination 




                                                 




This thesis has focused on the cognitive bias and risk tolerance of the investors. It was 
noted that the behavior of investors has a crucial role in decision making, since there are a lot of 
factors – overconfidence, representativeness bias, base rate neglect, loss aversion, endowment 
effect, anchoring, availability bias, procrastination, herding - affecting the financial decision 
making. It was observed that investors are rarely behaving according to the assumption of 
traditional economic theories such as: Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, 
Markowitz, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Arbitrage Pricing Theory, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
theory and the Black Scholes/Merton option pricing mode etc...  
A lot of researches made in the field of behavioral finance are suggesting that investors 
are not fully rational since they are driven by greed and fear, misled by extremes of emotions, 
whims of the crowd and subjective thinking. In my opinion, it is quite important to note that the 
important findings of traditional economic theories may not be vanished, even if in the real 
finance world, we observe that the assumption made are often unrealistic. The behavioral finance 
maybe it should be considered as an integration of those theories, a bridge between theory, 
evidence and practice. In other words, behavioral theory could be seen as an attempt to find the 
reasons why the economic theories are not always working. Therefore, finance education should 
not only focus on traditional economic theories but also on aspects such as mistakes need to be 
avoid while investing and strategies in financial markets for earning more.  
The behaviors are affecting the decision made by investors and their risk profile, since 
affective and cognitive aspects make the perceived risk different from the objective risk. The risk 
tolerance of a client is defined as the level of financial risk that an investor is willing to take, in 
other words as the maximum uncertainty someone is willing to accept when making a financial 
decision. In order to identify the mismatches between a client’s psychological and financial needs 
is crucial understanding the risk tolerance. Different studies observed that individuals having 
different levels of financial risk tolerance are expected to act differently when making investment 
decisions. Taking into consideration the findings of behavioral finance it may be a good idea 
since all the cognitive bias can lead to a different perception of risk. Other factors affecting risk 
tolerance are: age, gender, marital status, education, financial knowledge, and income.  
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From the perspective of legislations, it was observed the importance of “know your 
client” regime and as a consequence the importance of suitability and appropriateness test. By 
different studies made by supervisory authorities it was observed that questionnaires made by 
investment firms for defining the client risk profile were presenting important weaknesses such as: 
wrong client classification, not optimal description of risk categories etc.  
A conclusion though - Technology can help lessen the negative impact of common 
decision-making mistakes on personal finance outcomes. For example, it can contribute on 
tackling these three-behavioral finance bias: (i) salience, (ii) present bias and procrastination, and 
(iii) loss aversion.  
The first bias is referring to how noticeable an event or information is. Technology help 
lessening the negative impact of this bias by creating a number of budgeting apps aim to help users 
address this bias by collating debt, bills and spending information in an easily accessible interface. 
The idea is that having all of this information readily available can make it easier for people to be 
proactive about their finances. Regarding the present bias and procrastination, technology may help 
by setting apps aim to address this bias by helping users stay on track with their goals via frequent 
reminders, penalties, peer pressure and game-like features. For the third, instead, technology creates 
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